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ABSTRACT 
When we think of Foreign Internal Defense (FID), we most often think of 
conducting missions “by, with and through” a Partner Nation’s government and 
patrolling alongside partner nation security forces who are embroiled in yet 
another conflict in a “bad” region of the world.  But, in some conflicts, this very 
direct method of training and advising is inadvisable at best, and foolhardy at 
worst.  In Pakistan right now, “by, with, and through” represents just such a 
foolhardy approach.   
This thesis will not only substantiate that assertion but by presenting the 
“menu” of training and advisory choices the United States and other nations have 
will point to a “third way”—a method of training and advising that should not be 
as unfamiliar as it seems to be, since the United States used it very effectively 
just thirty years ago, and in the same general vicinity.         
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I. INTRODUCTION  
The Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) form a buffer between 
Islamabad-controlled Pakistan and the rough border region of Pakistan and 
Afghanistan.  The FATA is considered by many to be the most dangerous place 
in the world.  It is especially dangerous to Westerners, even more so to 
Americans, and incredibly dangerous to American service members.  It is a place 
where even Pakistani soldiers do not go unless they are moving as a part of a 
unit—and even then, very carefully.   
American operations in Pakistan and Afghanistan and, more specifically, 
what is perceived to be our puppet-like control over Islamabad, makes even 
being seen by the FATA populace extremely dangerous.  These operations have 
been like gas thrown on the fire of militant Islamic hatred toward the West and 
Western policies.  More specifically, our presence fuels hatred among the 
Pashtun tribes in the FATA, peoples whose cooperation the United States may 
need in order to achieve its goal of finding Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-
Zawahiri. 
U.S. Foreign Internal Defense (FID) measures inside Pakistan began in 
late 2001, with small teams of intelligence personnel and some special 
operations troops working in cooperation with the Pakistani government to get a 
“feel” for what was taking place on the Pakistani side of the Afghan border.  Over 
time, these efforts have led to a relatively large U.S. footprint inside the 
Northwest Frontier Province and even the FATA, and consist of U.S. unilateral 
direct action raids, drone aircraft launches (often from within Pakistan), and U.S. 
training programs for the Pakistani Special Service Group (SSG) and the Frontier 
Corps (FC).  See Figures 1 and 2 for maps of Pakistan. 
 2
                                           
Since 2009, the United States has conducted more drone strikes than in 
any period prior.1  Sometimes these have been effective, when senior Taliban 
leaders are killed. But sometimes, they have proven to be catastrophic, when 
there are innocent civilian casualties.  Regardless of the effectiveness of these 
operations, or of the U.S./Pakistani cooperation they require, they have enraged 
the populace, not only in the FATA and Northwest Frontier Province, but also 
throughout comparatively liberal Punjab and Islamabad itself.   
U.S. Army Special Forces teams currently train with SSG personnel on 
SSG bases in Attock Fort, Tarbela, and Cherat, NWFP, outside the FATA.2  
Special Forces also trains Frontier Corps units, but within the FATA in an attempt 
to help bring the insurgency down to an “acceptable” level.  The United States’ 
hope is that soon it will be able to conduct joint U.S./Pakistani operations against 
the Taliban and al-Qaeda in the FATA—something the Pakistanis will never 
accept the U.S. military attempting unilaterally.3   
Every member of U.S. Army Special Forces and Civil Affairs has been 
indoctrinated with the idea that, when conducting Foreign Internal Defense (FID), 
it is imperative to operate “by, with, and through” local forces.  After all, this is 
what makes Special Forces special.  It is the only trait that distinguishes U.S. 
Army Special Forces from other Special Operations Forces (SOF).  To conduct a 
raid, ambush, or airfield seizure, the United States has the Rangers.  To find a 
specific enemy personality in the middle of a heavily populated Third World city, 
the United States has special mission units.  To conduct quality maritime or 
waterborne missions, the United States has the SEALs.  All of these are Special 
Operations Forces.  But, none is Special Forces. 
 
1 Peter Bergen, “Pakistan Drone War Takes a Toll on Militants—and Civilians,” CNN: Opinion 
(2009), http://edition.cnn.com/2009/OPINION/10/29/bergen.drone.war/ (accessed February 20, 
2010). 
2 One of the authors of this thesis was the Special Forces Detachment Commander who, in 
2006 and 2007, coordinated and conducted two cycles of this training with the SSG in Pakistan.  
3 Ann Scott Tyson, “U.S., Afghans and Pakistanis Consider Joint Military Force,” The 
Washington Post, sec. A, September 23, 2008, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2008/09/22/AR2008092203036.html (accessed February 28, 2009). 
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No unit other than Special Forces in the U.S military has the level of 
specific training necessary to conduct Unconventional Warfare (UW), and 
although the DoD has chartered other special operations and conventional units 
to conduct FID, no unit but Special Forces has the level of training tailored to the 
FID mission.  When people think of FID, they primarily think of a twelve-man 
Special Forces Operational Detachment-Alpha (SFODA) training and advising a 
partner nation (PN) battalion against an internal or external threat.   
Typically, U.S. military commanders constantly tell their units to “put an 
[insert partner nation] face” on their missions.  This, of course, means the 
commander expects his unit to make sure the partner nation’s security force is 
out front, with U.S. troops barely visible, in order to demonstrate to citizens the 
effectiveness of their own national forces and, more importantly, to demonstrate 
the legitimacy of their national government.  Another aim is to ensure the 
perception that the PN remains sovereign, without it appearing to be under U.S. 
control—a principle that U.S. Special Forces should indeed reinforce. 
But, what if the situation is too politically sensitive—too politically sensitive 
for U.S. troops of any kind to operate inside the partner country, in a specific area 
of that country, or even in that region?  What if the concern is not so much the 
dangers posed by the enemy, as the dangers that inhere in the presence of 
outsiders inciting the population itself?  What if the population’s reaction to 
outsiders will make the FID mission counterproductive and worsen the 
insurgency?  Under these circumstances, instead of diving right in and “taking 
charge,” or attempting to emulate T.E. Lawrence on a massive scale, by using 
thousands of U.S. troops to “advise” a foreign security force, it might well be 
better to stand back and lead from the rear.   
Such is the case with Pakistan’s FATA.  The U.S. presence in the FATA is 
inflammatory, and actually contributes to the spread of violence in the form of 
suicide attacks against the Pakistani military and other government targets, to 
include Islamabad, the capital city of a nuclear power.   
 4
The argument this thesis makes is that the United States has catalyzed a 
bad insurgency and is making it worse.  The questions this thesis poses are: why 
are we training the Frontier Corps in the FATA, and to go even further, why are 
we training the Frontier Corps at all? 
 Figure 1.   Map of Pakistan (Available from the Perry-Castan͂eda Library Map 
Collection, University of Texas at Austin, https://www.lib.utexas.edu/ 
maps/pakistan.html, accessed February 15, 2010). 
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II. PAKISTAN: TRACING THE PROBLEM 
In the wider context of post-World War II decolonization, Pakistan, which 
gained its independence in 1947 and declared itself an Islamic Republic in 1948, 
was literally born of conflict, carved as it was at the eleventh hour out of the 
former British India Empire.4  At the time of independence in 1947, South Asia 
was transformed from the jewel in the British crown to the two dueling 
independent nation-states, India and Pakistan. The latter was itself then torn 
apart between East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) and West Pakistan (now 
Pakistan), a country that shares a long border on one side with India and a 
disputed and, in many places, ungoverned border with Afghanistan.  
By any measure, contemporary Pakistan has been located since its 
inception in an extremely turbulent area of the world, bordering not only 
Afghanistan, Iran and India, but also China and the Indian Ocean.  Contributing 
to Pakistan’s turbulent character are four provinces: Sindh, Punjab, Balochistan 
and the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP).  The NWFP, in particular, consists 
of tribal areas so fiercely independent that they were never governed in the 
British colonial era and remain formally and informally beyond the control of the 
central government to this day.  This situation is particularly marked in the 
Federally Administered Tribal Areas located within the wider NWFP.5 
This sliver of Pakistan is home to one of the world’s most significant 
insurgencies, and one that poses special dangers to the United States.  The 9/11 
Commission identified the FATA region of Pakistan as one of six primary regions 
in the world that either serve or could serve as terrorist sanctuaries.6  It is in this 
location that al-Qaeda operatives have had the “opportunity and space to recruit, 
 
4  William R. Keylor, A World of Nations: The International Order since 1945, 2nd ed. (UK: 
Oxford University Press, 2008), 452. 
5  Noor Ul Haq, Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan (Islamabad: Islamabad 
Policy Research Institute, 2005). 
6  Philip Zelikow, The 9/11 Commission Report (Washington, D.C.: National Commission on 
Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 2002). 
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Durand “Line.”     
                                           
train and select operatives … move money and transport resources (like 
explosives) where they need to go… [and] opportunity to test the workability of 
the plan.”7  Launching from the FATA, militants move freely back and forth 
across the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan to fight and to rest, 
resupply and recuperate, and they do so with only minimal resistance from 
security forces on the eastern side of the 
For this reason, the United States cannot ignore the FATA.  To do so 
would be to ignore a terrorist sanctuary from which another attack on U.S. or 
European soil could spring.  It would also be to ignore what might happen should 
the insurgency brewing there engulf Pakistan, a nuclear state.   
At the moment, the only control mechanism permanently in place within 
the FATA to quell and contain non-state and anti-state actors is the Frontier 
Corps, a predominately Pashtun paramilitary unit, poorly equipped and untrained 
for counterinsurgency.  Consequently, U.S. Army Special Forces teams in 
Peshawar and elsewhere in FATA are training Frontier Corps units in 
counterinsurgency tactics.  But, with already intense levels of hatred for the 
United States, and resentment of U.S. “meddling” in the region, this mil-to-mil 
engagement between growing numbers of U.S. Special Forces and the FC in the 
FATA makes little sense.  
So, how might the United States better assist Pakistan to guard against 
extremists finding and taking sanctuary in the FATA?  How might the United 
States better assist Pakistan to thwart the cross-border flow of foreign fighters 
into and out of Afghanistan, while also helping Pakistan remain strong and 
sovereign?  To answer these questions, we will draw on examples from relatively 
recent history when external forces were able to achieve a positive outcome 
while seldom having to set foot inside the conflict zone.  We will examine how, in 
the case of the FATA, the United States has the ability to borrow from these 
examples, play a less visible role, and develop the capabilities of an intermediary 
 
7 Thomas H. Kean, The 9/11 Commission Report. Public Report (Washington D.C.: The 
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 2004), 268. 
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—one that is more ethnically and culturally aligned with populations in the FATA, 
and one that could both train and advise the FC without further fueling hatred and 
resentment of the West.  This force is the Special Service Group (SSG), the 
Pakistan Army’s elite special operations unit.  Currently, the SSG does not train 
or advise the FC.  Instead, U.S. Special Forces is doing this directly.  For 
reasons that should become clear after we examine conditions in the FATA—in 
the remainder of this chapter—the United States should fall back on a more 
indirect approach.  
A. THE FEDERALLY ADMINISTERED TRIBAL AREAS 
The FATA is a tribal belt made up of Pashtun, or Pathan, tribesmen who, 
for as long as recorded history, have lived by a code known as Pashtunwali.  
This code consists of what many refer to as rules, but are really a set of norms 
dealing with honor, respect, revenge, forgiveness, and hospitality.8  These tribal 
norms govern individuals and demand strict adherence at the village level, which 
is where most enforcement occurs.  The Pashtun people themselves are 
subdivided into many tribes, and are locally governed by jirga councils made up 
of tribal elders.  No outside force has ever successfully governed the Pashtun 
tribes in the FATA.9  Instead, the tribes govern the tribes; the Pashtuns govern 
the Pashtuns.   
FATA represents a compromise, but administratively is still an 
independent tribal region self-governed through sharia law, and a part of the 
NWFP of Pakistan.  The Provincial Assembly of the Northwest Frontier Province 
in Peshawar acts as a liaison between the 124 districts that make up the 
province, and the central government in Islamabad.  “The British gave the Areas 
the clearly defined geographical shape that has more or less been maintained till 
today and incorporated the territory as an autonomous hedge between 
 
8  Shuja Nawaz, FATA: A most Dangerous Place: Meeting the Challenge of Militancy and 
Terror in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan (Washington, D.C.: Center for 
Strategic and International Studies, 2009). 
9  Ul Haq, Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan, 17–19. 
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Afghanistan and India to avoid the friction between neighbors caused by a 
common border.  The FATA is an “Ilaqa ghai, or a state within a state.”10  
For its part, the Durand Line, which demarcates the border region 
between Pakistan and Afghanistan, looks very little like a traditional border with 
razor wire fences, manned checkpoints, and spotlights.  In some places, a line of 
white painted stones along a mountain ridge or in the sand is the only sign that 
one is crossing from one country to the other.  Often, nothing marks the crossing 
at all; it is as if the line has been drawn across water, and disappeared as soon 
as it was drawn.  Tribal peoples, predominantly Pashtun, freely flow between 
these two halves of what was, at one time, theirs and no one else’s.   
At the same time, this area is among the geographically roughest on the 
planet.  When seen from above, the terrain resembles a crumpled sheet of paper 
with all its clefts and divides.  Mountain peaks up to 20,000 feet form ranges 
stretching miles, through territory so steep and rough that most of its inhabitants 
climb it only to fight, smuggle, or hide.  The southern border between Pakistan 
and Afghanistan is lower in altitude, but rocky, brown, trackless, and inhospitable, 
especially to government troops who require constant logistical support from 
hundreds of miles away.  
Troops securing the FATA require resources such as food, water, fuel, 
wood, ammunition, spare parts, and building supplies.  They also have to secure 
the roads in order to obtain these supplies.  Permanent bases such as Khar and 
Bajaur Forts, situated near the Afghan border, require a logistics tail that is 
chronically vulnerable to ambush in this harsh, desolate terrain.  Use of the 
Frontier Corps helps mitigate some of these logistical needs in that the FC is able 
to operate by drawing many of its resources from the local economy and markets 
in the FATA.   
 
10  Ul Haq, Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan, 17–19. 
 Figure 2.   Map of the FATA (From Roggio, 2008) 
B. THE FRONTIER CORPS 
The Frontier Corps is a paramilitary unit made up of ethnic Pashtuns 
established by the British in 1949 from within the Pakistani Interior Ministry.  
Current opinion is that it is a “poorly armed and untrained police force”11 
                                            
11 Associated Press, “U.S. Training Pakistani Forces to Fight Taliban,” October 24, 2008, 
MSNBC.com, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/27363202/ (accessed January 30, 2009). 
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traditionally responsible for border control and counternarcotics operations. But, 
since September 2001, Islamabad has heaped much more responsibility on the 
FC.  FC units historically spent their years of service patrolling vast, sparsely 
populated areas of western Pakistan, or sitting in tiny observation huts on the 
Afghan border.  In the last few years, however, Islamabad, partly in response to 
U.S. pressure, has pushed for the FC to act in roles similar to those of regular 
army infantry units.  Consequently, FC units have been conducting offensive 
operations in areas where militants have established strongholds.  From their 
main headquarters at Bala Hissar Fort in Peshawar, FC troops now move in 
company- and battalion-sized elements to conduct offensive operations from 
outposts farther west.    
Many FC troops’ extended families live near the outposts the troops 
protect.  Almost all FC troops are Pashtun, and, therefore, relate more closely to 
local civilians than do the more ethnically mixed, but predominately Punjabi 
Pakistani Army units.  This ethnic sympathy sometimes causes FC troops to turn 
their heads when fellow tribesmen cooperate with Taliban forces.  The isolated 
and remote nature of the FC troops’ stations can also help make the troops 
receptive to insurgent influence, especially since, by design, the Islamabad-
based government has very little real control in the FATA.  Even if this influence 
does not stem from shared beliefs, it is still quite potent in that the troops are 
literally surrounded by tribes who do not recognize Islamabad as their capital, 
with some who do not recognize Pakistan as their nation, either.   
The FC and other Pakistani soldiers until recently referred to those who 
stirred up trouble in the FATA as “miscreants” and not “terrorists,” which is the 
term the West uses.12  The problem with “miscreant” as a label is that it implies 




12  Frontier Corps Headquarters, Guide for Newly Posted Officers (Balla Hissar Fort, 
Peshawar, Pakistan: Headquarters, Frontier Corps, 2004), 1–38. 
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their own society—something that reveals quite a bit about the government’s 
view of the larger problem, and further diminishes the impetus for the FC to 
conduct proactive aggressive operations.    
Up until recently, too, the FC was trained to simply guard the border and 
keep the peace in a tribal region, and to be ready should the Pakistan Army need 
its help in fighting conventional battles.  Less well recognized, but almost as 
important, was another task described in the Frontier Corps Officer Manual: to 
raise, arm and direct local tribal militias, known as lashkars.  Lashkar militiamen 
work side by side with the FC and the Army.  For instance, the Salarzai Tribe in 
East Bajaur formed one of the largest of these civil militias in late 2008, claiming 
to have 4,000 fighters.13  The Salarzai once supported the Taliban, but turned 
against it when the Taliban started killing Salarzai tribal leaders.  In areas where 
the lashkars have worked with the FC and the army, shops have remained open 
and people walk the streets as freely as they did before the militant violence 
began.  Synergies like this are not a new phenomenon in the FATA.   
Tellingly, the FC has proved capable of raising lashkars on its own, 
without U.S. intervention or “help.”  Indeed, lashkars have been used for 
centuries during periods of emergency.  Their potential effectiveness signals how 
much can be achieved when security forces (e.g., the FC) have ties to the 
populace.  Still, by itself, the Frontier Corps is a weak deterrent when it comes to 
preventing foreign militants from finding sanctuary in the FATA, just as they have 
not effectively stopped the cross-border flow of fighters in and out of Afghanistan.  
With support from the Pakistani military and a thoughtful, indirect campaign to 






13 Al Jazeera, "Pakistan's War: On the Frontline," 
http://www.linktv.org/programs/witness_pakistans_war_frontline (accessed October 15, 2009). 
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better chance of reducing militancy and bringing the FATA back to a state of 
normalcy.14  Meanwhile, without the FC, it is doubtful any counterinsurgency 
campaign will succeed.     
To further highlight why the United States needs to reassess its role in the 
FATA and with the FC more carefully, consider: before every major operation in 
2008, General Tariq Khan, the Frontier Corps Commander at Bala Hissar Fort in 
Peshawar, gave a pep talk to his men.  Other Pakistani military commanders in 
regular army units feel they must do the same, ensuring their men understand 
why they are fighting fellow Pashtuns, fellow Pakistanis, and fellow Muslims.   
In the years immediately after 9/11, many Pakistani officers and soldiers 
asked to leave the military knowing they would have to fight other Muslims and 
their fellow tribesmen.  Most were sympathetically allowed to resign or cancel 
their contracts.  The military now pre-screens enlistees and officer candidates for 
unwillingness to fight inside their own country against their own countrymen.  
This dynamic is especially poignant for the FC because in addition to facing 
fellow-Muslims and even fellow-tribesmen, the rank and file in the FC are all 
local; they are interacting among their neighbors.  Leaders of the FC 
continuously have to convey to their troops the message that the militants “have 
taken Islam into their own hands.”15  Before missions, commanders ask their 
troops if it is “fair that these militants should decide who is or is not a good 
Muslim.”  The troops answer “No Sir!” in unison.16   
These are just a few indicators of how difficult this fight is for Pakistanis, 
and particularly for those who serve their country by having to serve against their 
fellow citizens.  This is only further exacerbated when the government is viewed 
as doing the bidding of the Americans.17 
 
14 Albeit normalcy for a rough, tribal region where “law” is built into cultural norms and not 
central government. 
15 Al Jazeera, “Pakistan’s War.”  
16 Al Jazeera, “Pakistan’s War.”  
17 Christine Fair, “Confronting the Pakistan Problem,” Public Broadcasting System, 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/taliban/pakistan/fair.html (accessed September 3, 2009).   
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C. THE ENEMY  
The Afghan Taliban and U.S. Action 
The Taliban in Afghanistan is a Sunni Islamist organization formed in the 
aftermath of the Soviet Union’s rapid retreat after its bloody ten-year occupation 
of the country.  The Taliban ruled Afghanistan with an incredibly heavy hand, 
performing executions without juries in the streets over petty crimes and meting 
out an extreme and very literal form of sharia law.  The Taliban in Afghanistan is 
comprised of a number of ethnicities and nationalities, including Afghan and 
Pakistani Pashtuns, Punjabis, Uzbeks, Tajiks, Chechens, Arab volunteers, and 
others.  Initially, these forces operated and governed inside the vacuum that was 
Afghanistan, not venturing outside Afghanistan’s borders, though they did garner 
support from the Pakistani government and others as a means to further 
Pakistan’s “strategic depth” against Indian encirclement from the west. 
The Afghan Taliban has numerous sub elements throughout Afghanistan 
and is headed by Mullah Mohammad Omar, though he has been in hiding since 
late 2001.  Many believe he is hiding in or near Quetta, Pakistan, where he and 
others continue to “direct” operations through what has come to be known as the 
Quetta Shura.18  
The U.S. military destroyed the Afghan Taliban’s governmental 
infrastructure in late 2001, and those Taliban who did not flee to Pakistan 
dispersed into small bands throughout Afghanistan or, in some cases, simply put 
down their Kalashnikov rifles and rocket propelled grenade launchers and went 
back to farming.  Even so, not long after the initial invasion, the United States 
was forced to take more seriously the safe haven provided over the Afghan 
border in Pakistan.  The Coalition could not “finish” the Taliban in Afghanistan if 
all the insurgents needed to do was to escape a few kilometers into the 
mountains and across the Durand Line into the FATA, finding refuge and support 
 
18 K. Alan Kronstadt, Islamist Militancy in the Pakistan-Afghanistan Border Region and U.S. 
Policy (Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2008), 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34763.pdf (accessed November 17, 2009). 
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in tribal areas which also rendered them “untouchable” by the United States.  
Eventually, through cooperation with the Pakistanis, the United States proved 
able to operate more aggressively across this border.  
In late 2003, the U.S. government announced to the Pakistanis that U.S. 
intelligence sources had hard evidence that al-Qaeda members were taking 
refuge in South Waziristan, and Washington went on to warn Islamabad that if 
the Pakistan Army did not take care of al-Qaeda, then the U.S. military would.19  
The Pakistanis delayed, but early in 2004, they sent more than 80,000 soldiers 
into the FATA in an unprecedented move to root out the militants.  These same 
militants, meanwhile, killed over 200 tribal leaders in order to establish their 
control over the area and repel the Pakistan government forces.  After losing 
more than 250 troops, the Pakistanis withdrew, and the government came to an 
agreement with the militants.  At the time, these groups were described locally as 
“Pakistani Taliban.”   
Off and on through 2006, nearly 80,000 Pakistani troops continued to 
make incursions into North and South Waziristan, eventually ending with the 
Waziristan Accord.  Throughout the fighting, the Taliban continued to insert their 
own leaders into the tribal structure and, in many cases, these leaders remain in 
power today.  Each time the Pakistanis entered the FATA, the result was an 
increase in the numbers of militants, as passive followers of the Taliban became 
militant followers.   
TTP Leadership 
Contrary to all-too-popular belief, the Taliban is not a monolith.  Tehrik e 
Taliban Pakistan (TTP) is an offshoot organization, distinct from what most in the 
West refer to as “Taliban.”  The TTP was established by a shura of forty senior 
Taliban members in the FATA, drawing representation from all the FATA districts 
and from the settled districts within the NWFP.  Baitullah Mehsud, an ethnic 
 
19 “Barack Obama, Neocon,” Wall Street Journal, August 3, 2007, http://proquest.com 
(accessed February 14, 2010). 
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Pashtun from the Mehsud tribe in South Waziristan, was designated the 
organization’s amir.20  Before this designation, Mehsud moved to and from 
Afghanistan and allegedly received training from Jalaluddin Haqqani, the highly 
respected Soviet-Afghan war veteran.  Baitullah Mehsud’s rise to power came, 
ironically, only after the targeted killing of rival militant leader Nek Mohammed of 
the Wazir tribe, a direct opponent of the Mehsuds, by a U.S. missile strike in 
2004.  The irony comes from the fact that Mehsud was himself replaced in the 
same way in late 2009 by Hakimullah Mehsud (alias Zulfikar).21  Mehsud’s 
legitimacy grew as he began to have success after success in making Islamabad 
accede to Taliban demands and withdraw from the FATA.  In August 2007, 
Mehsud and his forces were able to capture more than 250 Pakistani soldiers as 
bargaining chips for release of Taliban fighters from Pakistani prisons.  At this 
time, Mehsud had a price on his head of $5.6 million.22  
Outside Pakistan, the TTP's closest alliance was with the Afghan Taliban. 
Baitullah Mehsud made a point of formally swearing allegiance to Taliban leader 
Mullah Omar.23  Reportedly, though, Omar lost faith in Mehsud once the TTP’s 
operations against the Pakistanis diverted forces from the Afghan campaign 
against the Coalition and the United States.  Omar also knew that increased 
attention to a militant problem in the FATA would bring more pressure on his 
secret base of operations, and would likely lead to Omar being lumped together 
with the TTP in the minds of Pakistani security forces.  Further widening the 
divide between the two groups was an incident in October 2009, when Afghan 
Taliban fighters killed six TTP militants in a dispute over an alleged kidnapping.24  
 
20 Hassan Abbas, “A Profile of Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan,” CTC Sentinel 1, no. 2 (January,  
2008) http://www.ctc.usma.edu/sentinel/CTCSentinel-Vol1Iss2.pdf (accessed November 12, 
2009), 1–4. 
21 Jane's Terrorism and Insurgency Centre, “Aims and Objectives of Tehrik e Taliban 
Pakistan (TTP),” Jane's Defence, November 13, 2009, http://www.janes.com (accessed 
November 15, 2009), 1–2. 
22 Jane’s Terrorism and Insurgency Center, “Aims and Objectives,” 1–2. 
23 Jane's Terrorism and Insurgency Center, “Aims and Objectives,” 1–2. 
24 Jane's Terrorism and Insurgency Center, “Aims and Objectives,” 1–2. 
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In a recent interview, Haji Muslim Khan, a spokesman for the TTP, claimed that 
there is “no difference between the TTP and Swat Taliban and the Afghan 
Taliban.”25  However, while it may be to the TTP’s benefit to claim ties with the 
Afghan Taliban, the Afghan Taliban regard the TTP as a threat to their sanctuary 
within the FATA, and worry about drawing the ire of Pakistani security forces and 
attracting increased U.S. attention.   
TTP Objectives  
We do not want to fight Pakistan or the army, but if they continue to 
be slaves to U.S. demands, then our hands will be forced.  There 
can be no deal with the U.S. 
— Baitullah Mehsud26  
According to the TTP’s own stated objectives, the organization hopes to 
unite the various pro-Taliban groups active in FATA and NWFP, and to create a 
single channel for all negotiations.  At the same time, the TTP hopes to support 
and assist the Afghan Taliban against U.S. and Coalition forces, and to 
“reproduce a Taliban style Islamic emirate in Pakistan and beyond, beginning in 
Pakistan’s tribal regions.”27 
In some areas of South Waziristan, the TTP has established governance 
and security for the local inhabitants through its tribal control mechanisms.  Also, 
in efforts to recruit more personnel into the TTP, the organization has established 
its own madrassas, educating children and garnering support.  In a region where 
security is so highly desired, many locals who may not agree with the TTP’s 
violent tactics nevertheless see the TTP as a beneficial alternative to a 
government whose reach is too limited.  
 
25 NEFA, “Interview with Haji Muslim Khan: Chief Spokesman for the Tehrik e Taliban, Swat 
Valley,” NEFA Foundation, http://www1.nefafoundation.org/multimedia-intvu.html (accessed 
November 12, 2009). 
26 BBC News, “Meeting Pakistan's most Feared Militant,” BBC News, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7420606.stm (accessed November 12, 2009). 
27 Jane's Terrorism and Insurgency Center, “Aims and Objectives.” 
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The TTP’s attacks center almost exclusively on Western interests, such as 
Coalition supply convoys, and Pakistani government installations.  Its attacks 
against the Pearl Continental hotel in Peshawar in June 2009 and the three 
suicide bomber attacks against the Marriott in Islamabad in October 2004, 
January 2007, and September 2008, were meant to discourage a Western 
presence in the region.  Attacks against Pakistani government and security 
forces are likewise designed to both punish Islamabad for its actions in the FATA 
and NWFP, and to coerce the government into not allowing the United States to 
dictate Islamabad’s policies. 
Pakistani Reactions 
The Pakistani populace writ large does not approve of these violent acts 
within the country’s borders.  But, judging from recent Pew polls, the population 
also does not approve of its government’s willingness to bend to U.S. will when 
64% of Pakistanis consider the United States to be an enemy.28 U.S. drone 
strikes, some of which have caused severe collateral damage, are highly 
inflammatory and strongly condemned, not only by citizens of the FATA, but also 
by urban liberal moderates living in Islamabad, Karachi, and Lahore who have no 
sympathy for extremists.  It is apparent that much of Pakistan’s population, 
especially those living in or near key cities, fears the TTP and its methods.  
However, this fear of the TTP does not necessarily translate into—and should not 
be mistaken for—support for the government’s military efforts in the FATA. 
Pakistanis want no U.S. influence in Pakistan and neighboring 
Afghanistan.  It is for this reason that the TTP, even if not directly supported by 
the populace, continues to be able to operate with relative freedom, certainly 
within the FATA, and increasingly within the Punjab. 
For instance, on August 5, 2009, U.S. drone aircraft bombed and 
reportedly killed Baitullah Mehsud.  On August 19, the TTP commander in Bajaur 
 
28 Pew Research Center, Pakistan: Growing Concerns about Extremism, Continuing 
Discontent with U.S. (Washington, D.C.: Pew Research Center, 2009), 
http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1312/pakistani-public-opinion (accessed November 17, 2009). 
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Agency, Faqir Mohammed, pronounced himself the group's temporary leader, but 
then retracted his statement when the group's shura named Hakimullah Mehsud 
as Baitullah's successor instead.  In an ironic twist, Islamabad publically 
condemned the drone attack on the grounds that it violated Pakistani 
sovereignty, even though it killed the militant leader who had caused such unrest 
in Pakistan, and even though the drone took off from and landed on Pakistani 
soil, most certainly with Pakistani approval.29  Events such as this typify the 
strange relationship the United States has with Pakistan, and further highlight the 
sensitivities of a population that may not actively support the Taliban, but 
certainly opposes U.S. action on Pakistan’s soil.  
Countermeasures Against the TTP 
The primary counter to the TTP is the Pakistan Army and, to a much less 
extent, the Frontier Corps.  The army has conducted numerous offensives in the 
FATA and NWFP, including its recent campaigns in the Swat Valley and Bajaur 
Agency.  It has approached the TTP problem militarily, using conventional forces 
and conventional tactics.  Although the government has subsequently claimed 
victory, arresting or killing hundreds of militants, it is unclear whether these 
actions will put an end to the militancy.  As many as 3,000,000 civilians were 
displaced and forced to abandon their homes in these operations.30  
Unfortunately, Pakistan does not have a force capable of population-
centered counterinsurgency on this large a scale.  Consequently, the Army’s 
tactics are often harsh and may create as many insurgents as are killed or 
captured.  Nor, as previously mentioned, do the drone attacks help.  The more 
drone attacks that are conducted, the more the populace backs the TTP or, at 
the very least, backs away from the government in Islamabad.   
 
29 Declan Walsh, “Pakistan's Top Taliban Leader Baitullah Mehsud Killed in US Drone 
Attack,” Guardian U.K., http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/aug/07/taliban-leader-baitullah-
mehsud-killed (accessed November 12, 2009). 
30 International Crisis Group, Pakistan's Displacement Crisis (New York: International Crisis 
Group, 2009) http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=5149 (accessed January 17, 2010). 
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D. U.S. INVOLVEMENT 
As noted, the U.S. government has stepped up its operations on the 
Pakistani side of the Afghan border since it began operations in the region in 
2002.  Initially, the United States limited itself to incidental “hot pursuit” scenarios; 
if Coalition forces were in pursuit of enemy combatants, they could chase the 
militants or engage them with indirect fires, artillery, mortars, or airborne firing 
platforms over the border into a 10-kilometer buffer zone of the FATA.  
Additionally, during the early stages of the war, the United States engaged in 
low-level, intelligence gathering missions in cooperation with the Pakistani Inter-
Services Intelligence (ISI).   
However, the focus has changed, since U.S. Army Special Forces began 
training Pakistan’s SSG in 2006.  Increasingly, the United States has sought to 
engage in combined intelligence gathering and FID, with much closer 
cooperation between U.S. and Pakistani military and intelligence personnel, and 
increasing numbers of drone strikes.  In September 2008, U.S. and Pakistani 
officials told the press that U.S. special operations forces had even conducted a 
direct action raid inside Pakistani territory, the first such operation without prior 
Pakistani approval.31  In other words, over time, U.S. military involvement has 
become more robust and overt.  Also in September 2008, this involvement 
became public with a press release announcing that U.S. SOF were training 
Pakistan Army and FC units in the Northwest Frontier Province.32  In actuality, 







31 Omar Waraich, “Pakistan vs. U.S. Raids: How Bad a Rift?” Time, September 18, 2008, 
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1842131,00.html (accessed April 30, 2010). 
32 David Montero, “US Military Prepares to Train Pakistani Forces,” Christian Science 
Monitor, http://www.csmonitor.com/2008/0416/p99s01-duts.html (accessed February 28, 2009). 
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but these newer training missions with the FC were in preparation for—as the 
United States hoped and Pakistanis fear—bilateral operations against the 
Taliban and al-Qaeda in the FATA.33   
Without question, the number of Pakistan Army raids and other military 
operations has increased steadily as the United States has increased its 
pressure on Pakistan.  But, as we saw in the previous section, militant extremist 
activity has likewise gone up, and has shifted from tribal in-fighting to the 
targeting of Pakistani government installations.  Numerous Pakistani military 
outposts have been brazenly attacked over the past three years, to include the 
suicide bombing of the officer’s mess on the very tightly secured SSG commando 
post in Tarbela, NWFP.  Nor has Islamabad itself been immune, with multiple 
bombings at the Marriott Hotel, a suicide attack at the arms factory at Rawalpindi, 
the explosive standoff at the Lal Masjid (Red Mosque), the assassination of 
presidential hopeful Benazir Bhutto, and the hostage situation at the Army’s 
General Headquarters (GHQ) in 2009, to name a few.  Do all of these stem from 
U.S. pressure?  It is impossible to say.  But, if this is what has happened in the 
wake of predominately Pakistani-run operations in the FATA and NWFP, imagine 
the response were Americans to be involved more directly or in greater numbers.  
One thing that can be said with a certain degree of assurance is that there has 
been more militant anger at the Pakistani government over increasing Pakistan 
Army and Frontier Corps operations in the FATA, while what U.S. involvement 
represents is “gas thrown on the fire.”  Nothing will signal to the Pakistani 
populace that Western desires trump Pakistan’s sovereignty more vividly than 
the physical presence of U.S. troops in the FATA. 
 
33 STRATFOR, “Geopolitical Diary: Implications of Overt U.S. Operations in Pakistan,” 
STRATFOR: Global Intelligence, June 17, 2008, 
http://www.stratfor.com/geopolitical_diary_implications_overt_u_s_operations_pakistan 
(accessed March 8, 2010). 
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E. PAKISTANI CONCILIATION 
Unfortunately, Pakistani military efforts to handle our mutual security 
problems have not been as successful as the United States would like.  In 
several recent instances, Pakistan has attempted to manage the Taliban through 
the use of conciliation.  Conciliation, a much more politically palatable word than 
“appeasement,” refers to an “attempt to remove tension between two states [or 
entities] by the methodical removal of the principal causes of conflict between 
them.”34  Traditionally, conciliation has been a viable option for Islamabad since it 
has little to lose and much to gain from the practice; if the government simply 
stops fighting insurgents in the FATA, then it gains Pakistani popular approval by 
not being seen as a puppet of the United States.  By reducing conflict in the 
FATA, Pakistan also loses fewer soldiers, spends fewer military dollars, and is 
able to focus on its real enemy—India.   
In September 2006, Pakistani government negotiators and key tribal 
leaders signed a treaty known as the North Waziristan Accord.  This accord 
required tribes to reject foreign militants and cross-border infiltration by Afghan 
insurgents.  It also asked that local members of the Taliban stop spreading their 
Islamist message outside their tribal lands.  In exchange, the government would 
reduce its checkpoints, reduce military activities and troops in the FATA, release 
certain key prisoners, and pay heavy compensation for innocent deaths.  This 
agreement allowed the tribes to continue to govern their own territories, and even 
to remain armed as long as they did not harbor foreign fighters or attack 
government troops.  The central government described the accord in the press 
as a victory for peace and stability in the region.  Only later did officials realize 
that they had made these agreements with some of the militants, and not 
necessarily with actual tribal elders.  Earlier in 2006, the Taliban had killed many 
of the tribal elders with whom the government intended to meet because the 
 
34 Alexander L. George, “The Need for Influence Theory and Actor-Specific Behavioral 
Models of Adversaries,” Comparative Strategy 22, no. 5 (December 2003), 463, 466–468, 
http://proquest.com (accessed October 8, 2009). 
 24
                                           
Taliban suspected them of supporting the government.  Reportedly, since the 
government’s initial jirga, more than 100 pro-Islamabad additional tribal elders 
were assassinated.35   
In light of these breaches of the treaty, the military moved back to the 
FATA in full force with its campaigns in Swat and Bajaur in 2008.  Finally, in 
February 2009, the Pakistani government signed a new truce with the Taliban in 
the Swat Valley.  As part of this agreement, the Taliban were allowed to govern 
via sharia law.  However, the treaty had been in force only one month when 
Taliban members publicly flogged a 17-year-old girl who they claimed had 
committed adultery, though, in fact, she had simply refused an arranged 
marriage.  The event was televised and the video hit the Internet, sparking 
outrage in Islamabad and in the West.  It also marked yet another broken treaty 
between the government and the militants.   
Pakistan’s penchant to make treaties with militants continues to frustrate 
U.S. diplomats, and even many Pakistani government officials who consider any 
concession to Taliban demands to be surrender.36  Worse from an American 
perspective, while such treaties may help Islamabad gain favor in the eyes of 
some Pakistanis, they neuter U.S. efforts in the region. 
Here, then, is a genuine source of tension between the United States and 
Pakistan: Pakistan is growing weary of fighting militants in the FATA, when it 
could have done just as well to leave the Taliban alone.  It could have vigorously 
denied the United States access to the FATA, and suffered few consequences.  





35 Marvin G. Weinbaum, “Counterterrorism, Regional Security, and Pakistan’s Afghan 
Frontier,” U.S. House of Representatives Armed Services Committee Hearing, (Washington, 
D.C., October 10, 2007) http://www.insidedefense.com (accessed January 27, 2009), 2.  
36 Farhan Bokhari, “Skeptics Voice Fear on Swat Valley Ceasefire,” Financial Times, 
February 23, 2009, http://www.proquest.com (accessed March 8, 2009). 
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the only consequence the Pakistani government might have suffered would have 
been the loss of billions of U.S. dollars earmarked for Pakistani military 
development.37   
The United States clearly does not want Pakistan to curtail its military 
efforts in the FATA or NWFP, since this would leave the U.S. military with only 
two unthinkable options: continue to try to fight alone from the Afghan side of the 
border, or proceed unilaterally into Pakistan’s Tribal Areas.  Both are unworkable. 
Perhaps, then, it is worth turning to what many consider a “third way.” 
Foreign Internal Defense.  Indeed.  But, as the next chapter should make clear, 
training and advising can be done by a number of different methods.  Not all are 
appropriate for Pakistan, let alone the FATA.  Or, to be blunt, there is smart 
training and advising, and then there is the kind of FID that has the potential to 
make a bad situation worse. 
 
37 Robert Menendez, “Virtually no Strings Attached to Military Money for Pakistan, According 
to New Government Report Unveiled by Sens. Menendez, Harkin,” US Federal News Service, 
Including US State News, June 24, 2008, http://www.proquest.com (accessed September 7, 
2009). 
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III. TRAINING AND ADVISING 
A. WHAT IS TRAINING AND ADVISING AND WHY DO IT? 
The United States Army has trained and advised indigenous forces 
throughout most of its history, with each military generation adding its own twist 
and flair to the basic concepts.  Today, the United States Army is conducting 
training and advising missions on a scale not seen since the days of Vietnam.  
As Secretary of Defense Robert Gates explained in 2007, “The most important 
military component in the War on Terror is not the fighting we do ourselves, but 
how well we enable and empower our partners to defend and govern their own 
countries.  The standing up and mentoring of indigenous armies and police—
once the province of Special Forces—is now a key mission for the military as a 
whole.”38   
Among other things, training and advising foreign security forces not only 
enables other countries to better themselves, thereby enhancing U.S. regional 
security, but meets U.S. foreign policy commitments and eases the “burden” on 
U.S. military forces.  According to doctrine, the United States will offer such 
support to a partner nation if one of the following three conditions exists:  “the 
existing or threatened internal disorder is such that action by the United States 









38 Robert Gates, Speech to the Association of the United States Army, Washington D.C., 
October 10, 2007, http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1181 (accessed 
February 14, 2009).  
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effectively using U.S. assistance; the threatened nation requests U.S. 
assistance.”39  Simply put, the general concept is to “help others to help 
themselves.” 
The strategic goal of any training and advising program should be to 
ensure the partner nation (PN) develops the capabilities to protect and defend a 
legitimate government.  Operational and tactical training and advising goals may 
serve as intermediate steps toward achieving this broader strategic end-state.  
But always, intermediate goals should contribute to building the competency, 
capabilities, and legitimacy of the PN security force.  In the end, PN sovereignty 
and governmental legitimacy are the decisive aims for any training and advising 
program.40   
The current conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan have led to a “revival” of 
training and advising constructs from previous eras, and doctrine has paired new 
terms with old concepts.  Today, most modern training and advisory missions 
can be categorized into two groups: Foreign Internal Defense (FID) and Security 
Force Assistance (SFA).  Both FID and SFA fall under the broader umbrella of 
Security Cooperation (SC) and Security Assistance (SA), with each term 
reflecting differences in the type, funding, and nature of assistance supplied to a 
PN.  For instance, Security Cooperation is a general term used to describe “all of 
DoD interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense 
relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests,”41 while Security 
 
39 The Department of Defense, Joint Tactics Techniques and Procedures for Foreign Internal 
Defense, 3rd ed. (Alexandria, Virginia: United States Department of Defense, 2008), II-1. In order 
to nest FID support within PN governmental capacities and capabilities, the proposed FID plan 
must support the PN’s Internal Defense and Development (IDAD) strategy.  As the Joint FID 
publication states,  “the entire FID effort is tailored to the needs of the individual nation and to 
effectively interface[ing] with the HN [Host Nation] IDAD organization.”  An IDAD strategy consists 
of the collective measures a nation takes to promote growth and guard against internal strife.   
The presence of an IDAD strategy is not only a necessary antecedent for a military FID program, 
but the success of a FID program hinges on the quality of that strategy.   This implies that the 
recipient of FID is a legitimate PN governmental security force. 
40 DoD, JP 3-07.1, III-9. 
41 DoD, JP 3-07.1, I-6. Security Cooperation activities provide most of the larger diplomatic 
framework required for FID and SFA activities.  Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) and 
Joint Chief of Staff (JCS) Exercises, for instance, are Security Cooperation activities.   
 29
                                           
Assistance involves a different appropriation process that provides PNs with 
“defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services by grant, 
loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of U.S. national policies and 
objectives.”42   
Doctrinally speaking, FID refers to the “participation by civilian and military 
agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another 
government or other designated organization to free and protect its society from 
subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency.”43  Although a primary mission for U.S. 
Army Special Forces, FID is by no means U.S. Army Special Operations Forces 
(ARSOF) or even Army-specific.  Inherently interagency and Joint, FID is meant 
to build a PN’s capabilities and capacities in order to better enable a PN 
government to secure its people, stabilize itself, and promote peace within its 
borders.  Although the military is the primary instrument of DoD’s FID efforts, 
U.S. FID doctrine mandates that other instruments of national power must be 
addressed during every FID operation.  One problem with FID today is that it is to 
be conducted when a PN faces internal threats only.44  Thus, as violent extremist 
organizations prove increasingly global in their reach and ambitions, they are 
outstripping what FID was designed to do.  Arguably, this is the challenge we 
face in the FATA, which does not wholly belong to Pakistan.     
Here is where SFA represents an improvement since it is defined as “the 
unified action to generate, employ, and sustain local, host-nation or regional 
 
42 United States Department of the Army, TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5-301: Building 
Partnership Capacity: Unified Quest 2008 (Fort Monroe, Virginia: Army Capabilities Integration 
Center, 2008), 19.  The Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) of 1961 and the Arms Export Control Act 
(AECA) of 1976 authorize SA, often through something called the Security Assistance Training 
Program (SATP).  While Congress authorizes and funds SA and the DoS supervises the SATP, it 
is the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) that coordinates resourcing and manages 
military activities within the SATP.  Programs within the SATP include Foreign Military Sales 
(FMS), Foreign Military Financing (FMF), and International Education and Training (IMET).  A 
Security Assistance Officer (SAO) usually administers these SATP programs abroad in a PN.     
43 DoD, JP 3-07.1, I-1.  
44 Although subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency may have third party, external 
sponsors, US military doctrine views the overall effort to free and protect society as an internal 
effort—a point, we would submit, is debatable.   
security forces in support of a legitimate authority.”45  A by-product of the 2006 
Quadrennial Defense Review, SFA is designed to pull together the efforts of the 
DoD to address internal and external threats by building the capacity of a PN’s 
security forces.46  It thus goes beyond FID by being able to incorporate Security 
Assistance activities like Peace Operations and International Military Education 
and Training (IMET), as illustrated in Figure 3.  As Colonel David Maxwell 
describes the distinction:   
SFA is a process that integrates the Foreign Internal Defense (FID) 
mission (which is inherently and by definition Joint and Whole of 
Government) with Security Assistance (SA) programs to be able to 
train, advise, assist, and equip the security forces (military, 
paramilitary, and police) a friend, partner, and ally (e.g., build 
partner capacity) in order to defend itself against internal and 
external threats.47   
 
Figure 3.   Bridging FID and SA with SFA (From FM 3-07.1, p. I-7) 
                                            
45 United States Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-07.1:  Security Force Assistance.  
(Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2009), I–1. 
46 USA, FM 3-07.1, I-2.   
47 David Maxwell, “Random Thoughts on Irregular Warfare and Security Assistance,” Small 
Wars Journal (December 2008), http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/159-
maxwell.pdf (accessed 10 October 2009). 
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In essence, both FID and SFA mandate “train and advise” operations that 
share many of the same principles; the main difference, again, is whether the 
threat to PN stability is internal or external.  The coin of both realms is legitimacy, 
which is often a fragile commodity.  Generally, legitimacy of a government is the 
by-product of a successful social contract between the people and their leaders.  
Central to most social contracts is the ability of a government to provide basic 
needs and some level of security to its citizenry.  Over-reliance on outside forces 
to maintain and foster this social contract, or to provide security, inherently 
weakens a government in the eyes of its population.  In principle, U.S. doctrine 
recognizes this when it acknowledges that training and advising success 
“hinge[s] on HN [host nation] public support…the sovereignty of the HN must be 
maintained at all times,” and when it points out that “the perception that the 
United States is running a puppet government” contravenes the basic tenets of 
training and advising.48  
Ideally then, training and advising missions for any given country should 
minimize the presence of U.S. forces as much as possible while also assisting to 
secure good relations between the PN’s security force and the population.  The 
best way to do the former is to minimize the visibility of U.S. assistance.  The 
best way to achieve the latter is to try to field a force that is not alien or alienating 
in locals’ eyes. 
While a truism, it seems important to point out that the more hostile locals 
are to outside interference the more problematic it will be to introduce large 
numbers of outsiders into the area—particularly when the goal is to win over the 
local population.  What makes more sense, instead, is to woo the population via 
acceptable intermediaries, ideally people from the local area who are already on 
the government’s side and who, through their actions, can represent the 
government as a force for good.   
 
48 DoD, JP 3-07.1, IV-14.  
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Here is where Pakistan offers an ideal set-up.  As we will explain in 
Chapter IV, the United States should not be training the FC directly or in the 
FATA.  Instead, U.S. Special Forces should work with elements of the SSG, and 
should train and advise the SSG about how to train and advise the FC.  
Precedents for such an indirect approach not only exist but represent some of 
the most successful training and assist missions undertaken. 
B. WHO CONDUCTS TRAINING AND ADVISING? 
As mentioned, training and advising programs need to be locally tailored, 
since all countries face unique problems.  Since the main effort in both FID and 
SFA operations is usually advisory, it is essential to choose the best advisors.  
The best program for planning, training, and equipping PN forces will be 
meaningless if those tasked with implementing it lack the necessary experience 
and skills.  Not only are advisors responsible for passing on their expertise, but 
their role should also be to ensure that their entire program remains congruent 
with national strategy, thereby ensuring synchronization of effort.   
With the emergence of the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare 
Training Center and School (USAJFKSWCS) in the 1960s, United States Army 
Special Forces has engaged in institutionalized advisory training for over four 
decades.  Not only must soldiers volunteer for Special Forces training and pass a 
rigorous selection course prior to entering USAJFKSWCS, but once an Special 
Forces candidate passes selection, he is subject to a minimum 18-month 
curriculum that includes combat, FID, Unconventional Warfare (UW), advising, 
and cultural and language training.  Although the capstone “exam” in the Special 
Forces Qualification Course (SFQC) is the month-long Unconventional Warfare 
Robin Sage exercise, which concentrates on the skills required to advise and 
train guerillas and auxiliaries, the difference between working with guerrillas and 
advising PN forces is only a matter of degree.  
In contrast, the General Purpose Force (GPF) does not maintain an 
institutionalized advisory and training school.  The Combined Arms Center (CAC) 
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at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas recently established a school designed to mass-
produce advisors and trainers for Iraq and Afghanistan.  The results of this effort 
have been mixed.  One reason may be that over the course of the two-month 
long curriculum, only ten training days are devoted to advising and culture 
classes.49  Ironically, the U.S. Army Drill Sergeant School, which is ten weeks 
long, devotes more of its time to training and advising.  Not only is the 
preponderance of the Military Transition Team (MiTT) train-up focused on 
unilateral combat training, but worse, there is no selection process for the MiTTs.  
Some individuals wind up on MiTTs due to inadequate performance in their 
functional areas.  Others volunteer to earn the requisite “combat” time deemed 
necessary for promotion.  The number of experienced and qualified trainers and 
advisors filling the MiTTs is estimated to be only 75%.  Worse, according to post-
deployment interviews, approximately 20% of the MiTT members coming out of 
Iraq and 40% coming out of Afghanistan considered themselves dysfunctional to 
the point that they felt their team achieved nothing credible over the course of 
their one-year deployment.50   
Clearly, Army Special Forces are better trained to conduct advisory FID 
missions than this.  As the manual for Joint Tactics Techniques and Procedures 
for FID (JP 3-07.1) indicates: 
FID programs may be conducted by a single individual in remote 
isolated areas, small groups, or large units involved in direct 
support (not involving combat operations) or combat operations. In 
almost all of these situations, U.S. forces will be operating in 
unfamiliar circumstances and cultural surroundings. The nature of 
FID programs indicates that the environment in which they are 




49 Center for Army Lessons Learned, “Combat Advisor Handbook,” No. 08-21 (Ft. 
Leavenworth, KS:  Combined Arms Center, 2008), 17. 
50 The Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance (JCISFA) maintains a robust 
database of after action reviews (AARs) and interviews.  These figures are representative of 
interviews conducted with approximate 3,000 MiTT team members through the 2nd fiscal quarter 
of 2009, provided to the authors by the JCISFA.  
instability, combined with the stresses of operating in a foreign 
culture, may require training that is not routinely offered by the 
Services to conventional forces.51   
Few Army leaders challenge such findings.  As the Department of the 
Army’s Training and Doctrine Command itself acknowledges, “the special 
operations community has always placed a premium on the qualities and skills 
required for effective engagement, and its culture, including accession, 
development, and assignment practices reflect this.  The same cannot be said of 
GPF.”52  However, while the current trend within the Department of the Army is to 
acknowledge ARSOF’s expertise in FID, it also concedes that there is more 
training and advising required in Iraq and Afghanistan than ARSOF can manage.  
Thus, GPF must now conduct Special Forces-like FID.  Unfortunately, the 
implication is that the only salient thing differentiating GPF and ARSOF foreign 
internal defense is numbers, not the quality or the type of the training or advising 
required, or the inherent skills and abilities of the individuals doing the advising.  
C. HOW CAN A FORCE TRAIN AND ADVISE? 
 
Figure 4.   Types of FID (From FM 3-07.1 p. I–6) 
                                            
51 DoD, JP 3-07.1, V-1.  
52 United States Department of the Army, TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5-301: Building 
Partnership Capacity: Unified Quest 2008 (Fort Monroe, Virginia: Army Capabilities Integration 
Center, 2008), 4.  
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Generally, training and advising missions are categorized in one of three 
ways: as offering/providing indirect support, direct support (not involving combat 
operations), or combat operations.  While conceptually neat, these categories are 
not necessarily discrete, as ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan 
demonstrate, and the U.S. Army may find itself conducting all three types 
simultaneously within a single country.  As a consequence, for the purposes of 
this thesis, we see greater utility in recategorizing training and advising missions 
according to whether it makes sense to conduct them: 1) “by, with, and through” 
PN security forces 2) “by and through, but not with” PN security forces or 3) via 
an “indirect–train the trainer” approach.  Our three categories borrow from 
doctrine, but re-fit it for realities met on the ground in places like Pakistan.  
D. “BY, WITH, AND THROUGH” 
“By, with and through” training and advising directly pairs U.S. forces with 
PN forces.  This type of training and advising includes combat support FID, direct 
support FID, and most SFA operations.53  When conducting training and advising 
operations “by, with, and through” a PN’s forces, U.S. forces are highly visible.  
For instance, this is what U.S. troops conducting combat support FID, direct 
support FID and SFA operations in Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan 
and in Operation Iraqi Freedom have been have been engaged in for the past 
decade.   
Occasionally, “by, with, and through” training and advising operations 
come at the request of a PN in order to help it fight an insurgency.  More often, 
however, these operations result from an effort to overturn a rogue or 
internationally defiant regime and/or to put in place and assist a government that 
will promote regional stability.  Even if much of the populace supports this 
 
53 U.S. military doctrine defines combat support FID as operations where U.S. forces 
“support, advise, and assist HN forces through logistics, intelligence or other combat support and 
service support means,” while direct support FID is conducted when a PN has “not attained self-
sufficiency and is faced with social, economic, or military threats beyond its capability to handle.”  
For more information, see the Department of Defense, Joint Publication 3-07.1: Joint Tactics, 
Techniques and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense, I–11.   
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process, there can still be resistance, and this resistance may become violent.  
The assisting force may then find itself in a situation where, while it is helping to 
build a new army and government, it must simultaneously fight an insurgency—a 
very difficult environment in which to train, advise, and grow a new force.  This 
was indeed one of the challenges in Operation Iraqi Freedom when, after the 
U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, the United States failed to fully secure the 
population.  In 2004, the U.S.-led Coalition had to then begin in earnest to raise 
and train an Iraqi Army (IA).  Special Forces A-Teams, referred to as Battalion 
Augmentation Training Teams (BATTs), and conventionally manned Military 
Transition Teams (MiTTs) were aligned with IA battalions and brigades, and 
began training programs and immediate combat advisory duties in an effort to 
quell the insurgency and secure the cities and populated areas of Iraq.54  The 
overall objective became to train the IA to a level whereby it could effectively 
conduct independent counterinsurgency operations, eventually allowing the 
United States to leave Iraq sovereign and democratic.   
U.S. forces involved in this training and advising had the highest possible 
visibility, living on IA garrisons and outposts and openly operating with the IA on 
missions ranging from supply convoys to routine patrols to direct action raids.  
Special Forces soldiers stood side by side with their IA counterparts, inspecting 
vehicles, watching street corners, securing election sites and breaking down 
doors in pursuit of suspected insurgents and al-Qaeda members.   
In most cases, IA soldiers were granted legitimacy by the populations they 
secured. Although some predominately Kurdish units operated in Arab 
neighborhoods and vice versa, the ethnic mix within the units themselves often 
reflected the demographic mix in their area of control.  The IA and the populace 
 
54 James P. Hunter, “Strengthening Iraq's Army,” Soldiers 61, no. 10 (October 2006), http:// 
proquest.com (accessed 10 August 2009), 14. 
 37
                                           
spoke the same language, worshipped in the same way and, most importantly, 
shared the same goal of reconstructing a secure, stable Iraq.55  
Yet, while Iraqi forces may have been considered legitimate by Iraqis, the 
Iraqi people were not accustomed to Western, let alone secular or Christian, 
soldiers “invading” their homes, running civilian vehicles off the road, and rousing 
people out of bed at night in search of insurgents.  Thanks to experiences like 
this, some Iraqis who previously had no interest in al-Qaeda or any sort of 
violence would later become insurgents, or at least be willing to accept $50 to 
place a grocery bag loaded with an improvised explosive device (IED) in a key 
intersection, knowing Coalition forces would soon drive by.  The presence of 
Western soldiers patrolling the streets, albeit in cooperation with Iraqis, proved 
unacceptable to many.  In the Iraqi case, visibility was a problem.  Americans 
were too alien and alienating.   
Even when a force takes the visibility problem into account, outsiders 
being present can still pose problems.  For instance, in the 1960s, the Cubans, 
with backing from the Soviet Union, attempted to spread their revolution into 
Africa.56  Although Ernesto “Che’” Guevara never succeeded at enlisting 
Congolese to pursue his revolutionary foco strategy, Cuba did find a communist 
rebel faction in Angola that was willing to accept its aid and intervention.  The 
result was a 26-year long involvement in Angola’s civil war.  Allied with the 
Movimento Popular de Libertaçäo de Angola (MPLA), the Cubans helped wage 
war against the pro-Western National Union for the Total Independence of 
Angola (UNITA) regime.57  
In order to effectively advise their Angolans, the Cubans realized they 
needed to blend in.  As a result, the Cuban Army (FAR: Fuerzas Armadas 
 
55 Most all of the IA units spoke Arabic, except in the case of exclusively Kurdish units, which 
relied on certain unit members to interpret while operating in Arab neighborhoods. 
56 William J. Durch, “Revolution from a F.A.R.–The Cuban Armed Forces in Africa and the 
Middle East” (Arlington, VA: Center for Naval Analyses, 1977), 3. 
57 Cuban advisory operations would end in May 1991 with a cease-fire agreement between 
UNITA and MPLA one month after the MPLA abandoned Marxist-Leninism. 
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Revolucionarias) recruited only Cubans of African descent into the Angolan 
advisory corps, thinking that skin color would suffice to “hide” the Cuban 
advisors.58  The FAR would eventually send up to 60,000 troops into Angola.59  
These troops would operate at the front lines of the conflict, often fighting next to 
MPLA soldiers.  However, despite their dark skin color, the Cuban advisors were 
easily identified by the population as outsiders.  Thus, even though the Cubans 
strove to operate “by, with, and through,” not even black Cuban advisers 
escaped their visibility as Cubans. 
More ironic still, by using superficially disguised Cuban troops in a direct 
advisory role with the MPLA, Cuba’s involvement prompted South Africa to send 
in its own troops to join UNITA in fighting the MPLA.  The fact that the MPLA was 
ethnically homogenous did not help; this prevented it from attracting members of 
other tribes.  Consequently, the Cubans and the MPLA were caught fighting a 
losing war that was negotiated to a conclusion after the MPLA abandoned its 
political agenda, leading scholar in Cuban and Angolan history Edward George 
to conclude: “The [Cuban] operation in Angola achieved very little in the long-
term, and might have been entirely in vain.”60  
“By, with, and through” is often tricky.  Sometimes, a country can find that 
it is stuck “dragging along” a reluctant PN’s army, coaching and advising along 
the way. Operation Enduring Freedom—Afghanistan (OEF-A) highlights the 
dangers of operating “by, with, and through” a reluctant partner.  
The initial U.S. special operations forces infiltrated into Afghanistan after 
9/11 were part of a UW mission.  Their task was to link up with the Northern 
Alliance and other anti-Taliban forces and, with robust air support, bring down the 
Taliban government.  As the Taliban was routed, and the Karzai government put 
 
58 Edward George, The Cuban Intervention in Angola, 1965-1991: From Che Guevara to 
Cuito Cuanavale (New York: Frank Case, 2005), 29. 
59 George, Cuban Intervention in Angola, 227.  
60 George, Cuban Intervention in Angola, 284. 
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in place in Kabul, the United States and the Coalition then began to develop an 
Afghan Army.  At this point, what began as UW morphed into FID.   
The challenges facing the Coalition were tremendous.  Afghanistan had 
not had a real standing army since the 1992 fall of the Najibullah government, 
when many of the units and their equipment divided into separate warlord 
factions.  Not only would the United States need to raise an Afghan National 
Army (ANA) from scratch, but it would have to involve itself in warlord politics, as 
representatives of militant groups from different corners of Afghanistan vied for 
power in the government.  At the same time, the geography and virtually non-
existent transportation system made raising an army logistically extremely 
difficult, as many of the men joining it had seldom wandered beyond walking 
distance of their own villages.  Ethnic rivalries were also a factor, with Tajiks, 
Pashtuns, and even Pashtun sub-tribes maneuvering for power.  Over the years, 
Afghanistan’s central government had seldom been able to fully govern far 
beyond any city’s center.  Tribal and ethnic differences have always made it 
difficult to reach consensus within the government—that is, until invaders arrive.   
In the early stages of the conflict, U.S. and Coalition forces were the sole 
sources of security, apart from warlords and tribal militias in areas the Coalition 
did not reach.  This means U.S. forces were not just highly visible when they 
were present, but represented a stark contrast to indigenous security forces.  
Even as the ANA began to grow in size and competence, there was a notable 
contrast between Afghan patrols operating out of light-skinned Toyota pickup 
trucks and large, well-armored U.S. vehicles carrying platoons full of U.S. 
soldiers.   
Because the ANA has had a difficult time recruiting enough men to 
provide security to all areas of the country, it has typically taken whomever it can 
get, regardless of ethnicity.  The army is ethnically mixed, but has a 
disproportionate number of Tajik soldiers compared to the estimated Tajik 
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population of the country.61  This can work out well for predominately Tajik units 
operating in Tajik areas, but can lead to a great deal of tension in other areas, 
especially when the Afghan population is between 40% and 50% Pashtun, and 
the Taliban insurgency is at its strongest in the Pashtun areas.  Tribal rivalries in 
these areas can divide families right down the middle.  But, when outsiders 
arrive, intra-tribal feuds are usually temporarily set aside to address this new 
external “threat” to tribal sovereignty.   
Military analysts, realizing that Afghanistan cannot be completely 
controlled from Kabul, currently debate about how to use the tribal system in 
Afghanistan to the central government’s advantage.  The Afghan Army has had 
some recent successes, but most of these are as a result of American and 
Coalition support and prodding.  According to President Karzai, it will be at least 
2014 before the Afghan National Army will be able to fight the insurgency on its 
own, and fifteen to twenty years before it will no longer need U.S. and Coalition 
support.62  At the time of this writing, U.S. President Barack Obama has 
committed to current levels of support through July 2011, and then promises to 
begin a troop drawdown.63  The disjuncture between these two leaders’ views 
about what can be achieved as the United States works by, with, and through the 
Afghans does not bode well for a resolution to the conflict.   
E. “BY AND THROUGH, BUT NOT WITH” 
The training and advising method of “by and through, but not with” 
excludes U.S. forces from participating with PN forces in tactical and combat 
operations, but not from working with PN forces in-country.  “By and through, but 
 
61 Obaid Younossi, The Long March: Building an Afghan National Army (Santa Monica, CA.: 
Rand Corporation, 2009) http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG845.pdf 
(accessed February 20, 2010). 
62 Alissa J. Rubin and Mark Landler, “Karzai Starts Term Vowing Afghan Army Will Control 
Nation's Security in 5 Years,” New York Times, November 20, 2009, http:// proquest.com 
(accessed December 15, 2009). 
63 Rajiv Chandrasekaran, “Differing Views of New Afghanistan Strategy; Civilian Officials 
Focus on Drawdown; Military Planners Think Winning is Achievable,” The Washington Post, 
December 26, 2009, http:// proquest.com (accessed January 10, 2010). 
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not with” programs include Civil-Military Operations (CMO), as well as logistics, 
communications, and intelligence gathering activities.  Under this rubric, U.S. 
personnel may deploy to a PN to assist during a natural disaster or other 
calamity that threatens that government’s ability to secure its people.64  Under 
such circumstances, U.S. personnel usually provide direct logistical support, 
communication and command and control infrastructure, and intelligence 
gathering assistance to the PN—effectively operating by and through, but not 
with local security forces.  Typically, this kind of training and advising occurs in 
permissive to hostile environments, and U.S. forces operate under complicated 
Rules of Engagement (ROE) that only allow U.S. forces to use deadly force in 
self-defense.  The advisory mission in El Salvador and Operation Enduring 
Freedom–Philippines (OEF-P) are two examples of training and advising “by and 
through, but not with.”  
Over the course of the 1980s and early 1990s, select U.S. Army Special 
Forces personnel took part in an advisory mission to assist the Salvadoran Army 
infantry brigades.  At the time, the Salvadoran government was under attack from 
leftist guerrillas.  In the wake of the Sandinista’s victory in Nicaragua in 1979, 
leftist guerrillas from Nicaragua and El Salvador joined forces to form the 
Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front, or FMLN.  The FMLN proved 
unusually adept at insurgency.65  In contrast, the Salvadoran Army had little prior 
experience with counterinsurgency.  The FMLN was able to operate all over the 
country with relative freedom, influencing certain segments of the population and 
building insurgent numbers and support.   
 
64 IAW DoD 5105.38-M, p. 563, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency’s Humanitarian 
Assistance and Mine Action (HA/MA) Programs provide the Combatant Commands capabilities to 
respond to humanitarian disasters. These capabilities are collectively termed Humanitarian and 
Civic Assistance (HCA) Programs.  When a foreign country suffers a disaster and requests 
assistance from the U.S. Embassy or the U.S. Embassy declares a disaster, the Disaster Relief 
process is initiated.  The Department of State validates the request and then requests DoD 
military assistance, if required.  After ASD(SO/LIC) approves DoS’s request, the DSCA is notified, 
which then begins to coordinate transportation and logistics assets for necessary supplies.  
Finally, the CJCS tasks an appropriate agency (usually a Combatant Command) to provide 
assistance to the country.  
65 Robert B. Asprey, War in the Shadows: The Guerrilla in History, 2nd ed. (New York: 
William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1994), 1095–1107. 
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From 1985 to 1992 Special Forces’s Brigade Operational Planning and 
Assistance Training Teams, or OPATTs, would train and advise “a 40-battalion 
army of 40,000 men scattered across the country in 14 garrisons with 
responsibilities for the security of dozens of critical sites and hundreds of civil-
defense units.”66  This mission was significant in Special Forces history because 
a small number of advisors (55 at any one time) had such a major impact on 
helping improve a foreign army and stopping a violent insurgency.  
American advisors taking part in the OPATT mission spent most of their 
time on the main garrisons of the brigades they advised, and were 
congressionally mandated not to take part in hostilities.  All advisors were 
required to speak fluent Spanish, and many were Hispanic members of 7th 
Special Forces Group from Fort Bragg, North Carolina.  They were thus often 
able to blend in with the Salvadoran soldiers.  Only three to four Special Forces 
NCOs or officers advised a brigade at a time.  The level of visibility these soldiers 
presented was necessarily low.  While it is not entirely clear that U.S. Army 
Special Forces advisors in El Salvador made the critical difference in defeating 
the FMLN, this operation illustrates how well a “by, through but not with” mission 
can work where 55 U.S. troops offer critical assistance while maintaining a very 
low signature.   
More recently, a similar approach was initiated in the Philippines.  To set 
the scene: in the 1970s, the Mindinao National Liberation Front (MNLF) posed a 
significant enough problem that President Ferdinand Marcos agreed to the 
Regional Autonomous Government in Western and Central Mindanao.67  This 
eventually led to the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM).  
However, not everyone accepted this concession; those who did not formed the 
Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF).  The MILF and the MNLF not only clashed 
violently with the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), but with each other 
 
66 Cecil E. Bailey, “OPATT: The U.S. Army SF Advisors in El Salvador,” Special Warfare 17, 
no. 2 (December 2004), 18–29. 
67 Thomas M. McKenna, Muslim Rulers and Rebels: Everyday Politics and Armed 
Separatism in the Southern Philippines (Manila: Anvil Publishing, 2002), 155.  
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throughout the 90s, with the MILF granting members of the kidnap-for-ransom 
terrorist organization Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) and the Southeast Asian Islamic 
terrorist organization Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) refuge, sanctuary, and training in the 
ARMM.68   
By permitting the development of an autonomous region within its borders, 
the Government of the Philippines (GOP) could ignore growing problems and 
corruption in the ARMM.  As long as the MNLF and MILF remained confined to 
the ARMM, the GOP seldom interfered.  It was only once the ASG and JI began 
to kidnap and attack targets outside of the ARMM that the GOP sent in 
government security forces. However, thanks to the autonomy previously 
granted—and the neglect of the area that ensued—both the AFP and the 
Philippine National Police (PNP) could gain little purchase with the local 
population and generated even less useful intelligence.  This led the GOP to ask 
the United States to help train a Philippine national counterterrorist force on the 
latest techniques and equipment.   
In March 2001, soldiers from the U.S. Army’s 1st Special Forces Group 
deployed to the Philippines to do just this.69 Once evidence captured after 
September 11, 2001, linked al-Qaeda with the ASG and JI, Philippine President 
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and U.S. President Bush agreed on additional U.S. 
assistance. 70  In 2002, the United States sent a Special Forces Task Force to 
Mindanao to assist the AFP search for international terrorists and eradicate their 
hideouts.71  The Joint Special Operations Task Force–Philippines (JSOTF-P) 
 
68 International Crisis Group, “Southern Philippines Backgrounder: Terrorism and the Peace 
Process,” ICG Asia Report 80 (Brussels: International Crisis Group, 13 July 2004), 2 
http://www.crisisgroup.org (accessed 7 September). 
69 C.H. Briscoe, “Why the Philippines?: ARSOF’s Expanding Mission in the War on Terror,” 
Special Warfare, vol. 17, iss. 1, (September 2004), 2. 
70 Thomas Lum and Larry A. Niksch, “The Republic of the Philippines: Background and U.S. 
Relations,” Congressional Research Service Report for Congress (January 2009), 16 
http://www.crs.gov (accessed February 26, 2010). 
71 C.H. Briscoe, “Balikatan Exercise Spearheaded ARSOF Operations in the Philippines,” 
Special Warfare, vol. 17, iss. 1, (September 2004), 18. 
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remains in place today.72  Consisting of approximately 600 personnel, the 
JSOTF-P is a small entity that is headquartered at Zamboanga City, Mindanao, 
but maintains liaison and coordination elements (LCE) co-located with key AFP 
task forces and units throughout the Joint Operation Area (JOA).  Since the 
Philippines is a sovereign PN, the United States does not conduct unilateral 
operations in the Philippines. Nor does it participate in tactical operations with 
AFP units. Instead, the JSOTF-P trains, advises, and assists the AFP in its 
operations.73 
By most accounts, JSOTF-P has been successful in helping the AFP gain 
legitimacy and trust in the eyes of the Mindanao people.  Since the Philippine 
Constitution explicitly forbids U.S. forces to conduct combat operations with the 
AFP, OEF-P is a classic example of training and advising “by and through but not 
with.” 
One sign of success is that there have been only three enemy-caused 
causalities over the course of nine years; JSOTF-P has clearly benefitted from 
the generally warm and receptive attitude of the locals toward the United 
 
72 JSOTF-P’s mission is to “support the comprehensive approach of the Armed Forces of the 
Philippines (AFP) in their fight against terrorism in the southern Philippines. At the request of the 
Government of the Philippines, JSOTF-P works alongside the AFP to defeat terrorists and create 
the conditions necessary for peace, stability and prosperity,” from Joint Special Operations Task 
Force–Philippines, “JSOTF-P Fact Sheet,” Joint Special Operations Task Force–Philippines, 
(Wednesday, April 1, 2009), http://jsotf-p.blogspot.com (accessed February 25, 2010). 
73 JSOTF-P lists its key operations as: (1) bring humanitarian assistance to conflict-affected 
communities through Medical and Dental Civic Action, Veterinary Civic Action, and Engineering 
Civic Action programs (2) share information with the Philippine Armed Forces to assist the AFP in 
planning future operations and (3) build AFP capacity through subject-matter expert exchange 
programs (SMEEs) to exchange lessons learned on subjects such as:  Explosive Ordnance 
Disposal, Tactical Combat Casualty Care, Marksmanship and Small Unit Tactics, Civil Military 
Operations Planning, Maritime Operations, and  Casualty Evacuation.” For more information, see 
the Joint Special Operations Task Force–Philippines, “JSOTF-P Fact Sheet.” 
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States.74 Because of this trust, JSOTF-P has been able to become more visible 
over time—using information operations to broadcast the positive effects of the 
AFP’s numerous civic action programs.  Also, by using local constabularies, the 
AFP has made itself more accessible to the local population.  The result is a 
highly effective training and advising activity that gives primacy to local 
sensibilities. 
F. “INDIRECT–TRAIN THE TRAINER” 
The “indirect–train the trainer” method of training and advising separates 
U.S. personnel from the PN security force by at least one degree.  With this 
method, the United States does not operate by or with the foreign security force, 
and ideally is not even located in the PN.  Rather, what it uses are indirect, low-
visibility activities that support the legitimacy of the PN government by “building 
strong national infrastructures through economic and military capabilities that 
contribute to self-sufficiency.”75  Indirect training and advising can include indirect 
support FID operations, such as JCETs and JCS exercises.76  Many indirect 
training and advisory activities fall under the U.S. Security Assistance Training 
Program, to include Foreign Military Sales, Professional Military Exchange, Unit 
Exchanges, and International Military Education and Training.   
 
74 Of seventeen total fatalities, only three were caused by enemy action: SFC Mark Jackson 
was killed by a motorcycle IED in Zamboanga while eating at a local food stand on October 2, 
2002; SFC Christopher D. Shaw and SSG Jack M. Martin III were killed on September 29, 2009, 
when their vehicle struck an pressure-plate IED on Jolo Island.  Ten soldiers and aircrew were 
killed when a MH-47E helicopter crashed during training over the ocean on February 21, 2002.  
The remaining three died as a result of non-mission related accidents. See Joint Special 
Operations Task Force–Philippines, “NCO honors fallen servicemen with painted memorial wall,” 
April 20, 2009, Joint Special Operations Task Force–Philippines Web site, http://jsotf-
p.blogspot.com (accessed February 25, 2010).   
75 DoD, JP 3-07.1, I-6. 
76 U.S. Code Title 10, section 2011 authorizes a unified or specified U.S. combatant 
command to pay for “expenses of training special operations forces assigned to that command in 
conjunction with training, and training with, armed forces and other security forces of a friendly 
foreign country.”  For more information, see “Special Operations Forces: Training with Friendly 
Foreign Forces,” Title 10, U.S. Code, Sec. 2011(a1), 2004, http://vlex.com (accessed February 
15, 2010). 
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International Military Education and Training is an example of indirect 
training and advising that “assists U.S. allies and friendly nations in 
professionalizing their militaries through participation in U.S. military educational 
programs.”77 Managed by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), 
this program exists to train and professionalize the militaries of foreign 
governments.78  Through this program, members of PN militaries attend U.S. 
military schools and programs.79 From 1950 to 2008, the United States trained 
over 707,592 international students.80  Annually, approximately 4,000 courses 
are taught to 7,000 international students at 150 U.S. military schools.81  In 2009, 
the United States administered over $94,793,000 worth of grants to students 
 
77 United States Department of State, “2008 Foreign Military Training: II. Description of 
Programs,” Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, 
http://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/rpt/fmtrpt/2008/126353.htm (accessed February 20, 2010). 
78 United States Department of Defense, DoD 5105.38-M: Security Assistance Management 
Manual (SAMM), (Washington D.C.: United States Department of Defense, 2003), 437, 
http://www.dsca.mil/samm/ (accessed February 8, 2010).   
79 According to the United States Department of State, the IMET program is specifically 
designed to: (1) further the goal of regional stability through effective, mutually beneficial military-
to-military relations that culminate in increased understanding and defense cooperation between 
the United States and foreign countries (2) provide training that augments the capabilities of 
participant nations’ military forces to support combined operations and interoperability with U.S. 
forces (3) increase the ability of foreign military and civilian personnel to instill and maintain 
democratic value and protect internationally recognized human rights in their own government 
and military.  The Security Assistance Managers Manual (DoD 5105.38) and the Joint Security 
Assistance Training (JSAT) Regulation outline the requirements and procedures required to enroll 
a foreign military officer or soldier in the IMET program.  For more information, see United States 
Department of State, “2008 Foreign Military Training: II. Description of Programs,” Bureau of 
Political-Military Affairs, http://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/rpt/fmtrpt/2008/126353.htm (accessed 
February 20, 2010). 
80 United States Department of Defense, Defense Security Cooperation Factbook. 
(Washington D.C., GPO, 2008) http://www.dsca.mil/programs/biz-ops/factsbook/FactsBook08.pdf 
(accessed February 8, 2010). 
81 United States Department of State, “2008 Foreign Military Training: Executive Summary,” 
Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, January 31, 2008, 
http://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/rpt/fmtrpt/2008/126350.htm (accessed February 20, 2010).  
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from 128 countries.82  Under IMET, international military students receive 
everything from English-language training to flight training.83   
The United States is not the only country to use the IMET concept.  The 
Soviet Union ran a very successful and productive IMET-style program, training 
Ho Chi Minh and his comrades from North Vietnam at venues in the Soviet 
Union.  Once the Soviets supplied the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) with Air 
Defense Artillery (ADA) equipment, small numbers of Soviet Military Training 
Teams arrived in North Vietnam to advise the NVA on the use of these ADA 
batteries.  Interestingly, the Soviets also trained elements of the NVA on guerrilla 
and revolutionary warfare outside of Vietnam and, upon returning to Vietnam, the 
NVA then trained the Viet Cong on these newly acquired skill-sets.  Such a “train 
the trainer” concept is a hallmark of IMET programs, and represents a truly 
indirect approach to training and advising.84 
Currently, the United States uses such an indirect approach in instances 
when it recognizes (or is asked to recognize) that it stands a much better chance 
of successfully assisting the PN, if it operates “below the radar” and less visibly.  
A contemporary example of an indirect training and advisory operation is ongoing 
in Thailand.      
When the 1909 Anglo-Siamese Treaty divided the Malay Peninsula 
between British Malaya and the Buddhist Kingdom of Thailand, the treaty’s 
demarcation line left three provinces within Thailand that were ethnically Malay 
 
82 United States Department of State, “International Military Education and Training Account 
Summary,” Office of Plans, Policy and Analysis, October 22, 2010, 
http://www.state.gov/t/pm/ppa/sat/c14562.htm (accessed February 20, 2010). 
83 Federation of American Scientists, “International Military Education and Training,” 
Federation of American Scientists, http://www.fas.org/asmp/campaigns/training/IMET2.html 
(accessed February 2, 2010), 5.  In 1990, U.S. Congress expanded IMET to include international 
civilian personnel and additional courses in resource management, judicial systems, and military 
codes of conduct. The expansion sought to institutionalize human rights vetting and instruction 
within the IMET program to ensure that the international students trained on U.S. soil were not 
past abusers of humans rights or likely to become abusers following the completion of training.   
84 Federation of American Scientists, “International Military Education and Training (IMET),” 
Federation of American Scientists http://www.fas.org/asmp/campaigns/training/IMET2.html 
(accessed February 2, 2010). 
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and majority Muslim.85  This gave rise to a secessionist movement that 
periodically flares into violence, most recently thanks to Islamist agitation.  
Consequently, the Royal Thai Armed Forces (RTARF) and the Royal Thai Police 
(RTP) find themselves embroiled in a counterinsurgency struggle with separatist 
and militant Muslim groups in Thailand’s three southern provinces.  
The United States maintains a long history of Theater Security 
Cooperation with the Kingdom of Thailand. Thailand is a Major Non-NATO Ally 
(MNNA), whose security is paramount to U.S. interests in the region.86  Most 
recently, the United States has provided equipment and training venues for the 
RTARF and RTP in an effort to better prepare these security forces for the 
counterinsurgency fight in the South.  Not wanting to further complicate the 
sensitive situation in the South, the U.S. and Thai governments have agreed that 
U.S. military personnel will not enter Thailand’s southern three provinces.87 The 
Thai government has been keen to avoid escalating or aggravating the conflict by 
bringing in the United States—a move that many feel would invite al-Qaeda and 
other global violent extremist organizations (VEOs) into the conflict.88   
Restrictions go even further.  U.S. forces cannot participate in training or 
equipping any Thai security force that is currently conducting pre-mission training 
(PMT) for deployment to the South.  U.S. military personnel may only work with 
Thai forces in the months before the Thais start their PMT block.  As a result, the 
Joint United States Military Advisory Group–Thailand (JUSMAG-THAI) 
coordinates for 40–50 U.S.-Thai combined training events at RTARF and RTP 
bases located in central and northern Thailand under the provisions of routine 
 
85 Rohan Gunaratna, Arabinda Acharya, and Sabrina Chua, Conflict and Terrorism in 
Southern Thailand (Singapore: Marshall Cavendish Academic, 2005), 2.   
86 Gunaratna, Conflict and Terrorism in Southern Thailand, 15.   
87 U.S. Department of State, “Thailand: Country Specific Information,” Bureau of Consular 
Affairs, February 27, 2010, https://travel.state.gov (accessed February 27, 2010).   
88 Gunaratna, Conflict and Terrorism in Southern Thailand, 9. 
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military-to-military/military-to-law enforcement exchange training.89  This helps 
the United States maintain an extremely low degree of visibility.  Better still, there 
is zero chance of a face-to-face encounter between a U.S. service member and a 
Thai from any of three southern provinces. 
Also, all efforts, good and bad, conducted by the Thai government are 
seen to be Thai initiatives.  This is important.  But, the problem the Thai 
government still has is it uses a nationally conscripted army and police force with 
too little representation from the populations it is trying to secure.  This lack of 
congruence between the security force and the local population has made 
intelligence collection and sharing difficult.  So has the chronic lack of 
coordination among Thailand’s security services.  Both hamper the effectiveness 
of U.S. training and advisory assistance to the government of Thailand.  
Where the United States had an easier time training trainers who were 
ideally suited for their operational environment was, ironically enough, along the 
Afghanistan–Pakistan border in the 1980s.  In 1979, U.S. President Jimmy Carter 
authorized U.S. government funding for the mujahideen in Afghanistan in order to 
counter the Soviet invasion, which Carter at the time called “the greatest threat to 
peace since the Second World War.”90, 91  Over the course of the next ten years, 
the United States channeled billions of dollars in equipment, weapons, and 
training to the mujahideen via Pakistan and other countries sympathetic to the 
Afghan cause.  This project was known as Operation Cyclone, a 1979–1989 CIA 
effort to arm the mujahideen.  The Carter Administration hoped to be able to give 
“to the Soviet Union its Vietnam War,” thereby, distracting the USSR and draining 
 
89 Joint United States Military Advisory Group–Thailand, “What is JUSMAGTHAI?” 
http://www.jusmagthai.com (accessed February 27, 2010).  
90 Chalmers Johnson, “Second Thoughts on Charlie Wilson's War,” Asia Times Online, sec. 
South Asia, January 8, 2008, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/JA08Df01.html 
(accessed January 20, 2010). 
91 Jimmy Carter, State of the Union Address, 1980 (Jimmy Carter Library, 1980) 
http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/documents/speeches/su80jec.phtml (accessed January 20, 
2010). 
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it of resources over time.92  After President Carter left office, the Reagan 
Administration used the CIA’s Special Activities Division to continue assisting the 
mujahideen.  One difference: the bulk of the training and support was channeled 
through the Pakistani Inter Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI).  The ISI was 
able to train an estimated 100,000 insurgents over the course of the occupation, 
and, perhaps even more significantly, it was also able to recruit support from 
other Arab states in order to counter the Soviets.93 
During this training and advising operation, the United States used 
methods that afforded it the least possible visibility.  The CIA’s Special Activities 
Division employed the fewest possible personnel as it engaged in extremely low-
level communications with the Pakistanis and the mujahideen.  With this 
approach, there was virtually no possibility of face-to-face contact between U.S. 
and USSR government or military personnel.  The United States also avoided too 
much direct contact with the mujahideen by operating through the Pakistani ISI, 
who were much more acceptable to the Afghan tribes and the many Islamic 
foreign fighters who flocked to Afghanistan to fight the Soviets.  These indirect 
aspects of the U.S. operation in Afghanistan from 1979 to 1989 were 
instrumental to its success.   
Worth pointing out is that the CIA’s operations in Afghanistan during the 
Soviet invasion and occupation contributed to one of the most effective and 
efficient FID or UW efforts the United States has ever undertaken.  They led to 
the eventual Soviet withdrawal and, many have argued, the Soviet quagmire in 
Afghanistan in turn precipitated the end of the Cold War.  All the while, the CIA 
was virtually invisible in Afghanistan, working via the ISI who matched the 
mujahideen not only ethnically, but also shared locals’ religion and objectives.  
This proved a deadly combination that altered the global landscape (for better or 
worse).  It may be no coincidence that success occurred when the United States 
 
92 L. Krauss, “Afghanistan: How We Got There,” New York Times, February 8, 2010, 
http://www.proquest.com (accessed February 26, 2010), 14. 
93 “Kashmir Imbroglio,” The Statesman, December 15, 2005, http://www. proquest.com 
(accessed October 10, 2009). 
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advised and trained a security force with which it already had connections in one 
locale, and then that security force went forward to advise and train a third force 
in another location.  After all, the “train the trainer” concept is the most indirect 
method the United States can apply.  With it, a PN cadre can adapt and 
implement its own “Domestic Internal Defense” programs and training.  This is 
what we have done, for instance, in the Republic of the Philippines beginning in 
the 1980s.   
As has already been noted, the southern island of Mindanao has a long 
“ungovernable” history.  But even in Luzon, a large communist movement 
continues to lurk.  Consequently, the Government of the Philippines (GOP) has 
needed a force that can respond with considerable flexibility.   
In 1987, President Corazon Aquino initiated the Civilian Auxiliary Force-
Geographical Units (CAFGU) program to “protect the people’s security against 
communist terrorism.”94 The CAFGU program replaced the failing Citizen Home 
Defense Force (CHDF) with CAFGU Inactive and CAFGU Active Auxiliaries 
(CAAs).  The CAA is an all-volunteer force of reservists who remain on active 
duty, unlike the CHDF or the CAFGU Inactive component.  The initial mission for 
the CAA was to: 
 Assist the local government authorities and the AFP Regular Force in 
the protection of life and property 
 Secure vital facilities and public utilities 
 Help facilitate the delivery of public safety services to villages liberated 
from insurgent control and influence95 
The AFP envisioned using the CAA as a “key player” in its “clear-hold-
consolidate-and develop” counter-insurgency plan.96  The CAA quickly became a 
 
94 Corazon C. Aquino, “State of the Nation Address,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 
July 27, 1988, http://www.nexis.com (accessed September 5, 2009), 4.  
95 Armed Forces of the Philippines Joint Staff, The Citizen Armed Forces Geographic Units 
(CAFGU) (Quezon City, Manila: Office of the Secretary Joint Staff General Headquarters, 1993).  
96 Armed Forces of the Philippines Joint Staff, Citizen Armed Forces Geographic Units 
(CAFGU), 5. 
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significant force multiplier for the AFP.  However, as the communist threat 
subsided in the late 1990s, so did the size of the CAFGU.  AFP Chief of Staff 
General Abu put it, “the CAFGU had a strength of about 80,000 in the late 1980s 
but was reduced to 30,000 when the insurgent threat was thought to have 
diminished.”97   
Today, the AFP equips, trains, and advises over 3,246 detachments of 
CAFGUs, comprising over 52,000 personnel located throughout the Philippines, 
with the majority currently located in Mindanao.98  The Philippine Special Forces 
advise and train 290 of these CAFGU detachments, providing an irregular 
warfare focus to the local volunteers.99   
The Civilian Volunteer Organizations (CVOs) are akin to a neighborhood 
watch that, unlike the CAFGU, the government does not subsidize.  
Occasionally, Philippine National Police (PNP) will offer training to the CVOs, but 
the PNP does not arm or equip them.  Consequently, reliable numbers for how 
many CVOs exist are difficult to obtain.  One of the benefits of having both types 
of forces lies in the fact that groups of volunteers from the same barangay100 fill 
both the CAFGU and CVO.  Often, too, the CAFGUs and CVOs operate close to 
home.  As the Philippine Joint Staff explains:    
The CAA’s effectiveness lies in the fact that they are natives of 
cleared barangays.  As such, they are familiar with the inhabitants 
and thus they can easily identify the rebels among the people 
staying within the vicinity of their communities.  Further, they are 
knowledgeable of the terrain in their locality hence the successful 
defense of territories.101   
 
97 Robert Karniol, “Lieutenant General Efren Abu–Chief of the Staff Armed Forces of the 
Philippines,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, (December 22, 2005) http://janes.com (accessed February 
25, 2010).   
98 Joseph H. Felter, Taking Guns to a Knife Fight: Effective Military Support to 
Counterinsurgency (Carlisle, PA: Army War College, 2008), 43.  
99 Felter, Taking Guns to a Knife Fight, 43.  
100 Barangay is a Tagalog version of the Spanish word barrio, meaning “district” or 
“neighborhood.”  It is the lowest civil administration district in the Philippines, approximate to a 
village or ward. There are 41,995 barangays in the Philippines. 
101 Armed Forces of the Philippines Joint Staff, Citizen Armed Forces Geographic Units 
(CAFGU), 9.  
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The ability of a local CAFGU to gather local information has greatly 
enhanced the AFP’s ability to secure the population from insurgent groups.  The 
CAFGU’s inherent shortcomings in training and discipline are also offset when 
they can be teamed with a small, elite cadre from the AFP Special Forces.  In his 
doctoral dissertation, Taking Guns to a Knife Fight: Effective Military Support to 
Counterinsurgency, U.S. Army Colonel Joseph Felter points out the success that 
comes with this CAFGU-AFP Special Forces union. In drawing on AFP situation 
reports collected over a thirty-year period, Col. Felter presents ample evidence 
that when the CAFGU has been paired with AFP Special Forces, fewer civilian 
and government casualties result, while greater rebel casualties are inflicted.102   
From the conclusion of the Spanish-American War in 1899 up until 1991, 
the United States provided external defense for the Philippines.  The keystones 
to this relationship were the Military Bases Agreement of 1947 and the Mutual 
Defense Treaty of 1951, the former allowing the United States to maintain 
numerous military bases on Philippine soil.103  However, in 1991, at the 
conclusion of the Cold War, the Philippine Senate did not renew these defense 
treaties.104  As a result, the United States handed over all its military bases in the 
Philippines to the GOP.105  Despite the breakdown in negotiations over the MBA 
and closure of bases, however, the United States remained one of the GOP’s 
closest allies, continuing to conduct security cooperation activities and provide 
security assistance managed by the Joint United States Military Advisory Group-
Philippines (JUSMAG-P).   
 
102 Felter, Taking Guns to a Knife Fight, 43 
103 Cherilyn A. Walley, “A Century of Turmoil: America’s Relationship with the Philippines,” 
Special Warfare, vol. 17, iss. 1, (September 2004), 8.  After the Philippines attained 
Independence post WWII, the USG and GOP signed multiple defense treaties that outlined U.S. 
responsibilities to provide external defense support to the GOP.  The United States established 
the JUSMAG-P in 1947 to maintain this security assistance relationship with the Philippines.  
104 Lum, “The Republic of the Philippines,” 16. 
105 Walley, “A Century of Turmoil,” 10. The Philippine Congress’s failure to ratify the MBA and 
the subsequent closure of Clark Air Base and Subic Bay Naval Base (both in Luzon) resulted in a 
drastic reduction of U.S. security assistance.  The United States has not maintained a permanent 
military facility in the Philippines since. 
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Tellingly, the U.S. Army Special Forces and the AFP Special Forces each 
have a long and storied, but also shared, past that stretches back to the early 
days of both forces; the trust and mutual respect between these forces have 
been fostered over years of consistent engagement.106  Today, U.S. Special 
Forces provide training to the AFP Special Forces at Fort Magsaysay and other 
AFP military bases.107  These AFP Special Forces then deploy forward to 
provide training and advice to CAFGU and CVO units.  As a rule, the United 
States does not accompany the AFP Special Forces on missions with the 
CAFGU/CVO.  In fact, outside of the southernmost island of Mindanao, U.S. 
Army Special Forces rarely provide command and control or intelligence advisory 
assistance to the AFP Special Forces.  Beyond the Joint Operational Area of 
OEF-P, U.S. forces are rarely, if ever, in direct contact with the CAFGU/CVO.  As 
a result, U.S. visibility is low.  Again, too, most of the individuals who belong to 
the CVO and CAFGU hail from the same barangays and clans and/or tribes that 
they volunteer to protect.  This “home militia” concept ensures a high degree of 
congruence between members of local CAFGU/CVO and the local population of 
each barangay.  
Worth mentioning is that neither U.S. GPF from PACOM, nor U.S. Special 
Forces, train the CAFGU or the CVO directly.  Rather, AFP infantry battalions 
and AFP Special Forces do this.  What U.S. Special Forces does do is to train 
the trainer: conducting security assistance and security cooperation events with 
the AFP, which then equips, trains, and advises the CAFGU. Not only does this 
keep U.S. personnel out of the mix in Luzon, but it ensures that people familiar 
 
106 Walley, “A Century of Turmoil,” 10.  In 1999, the GOP ratified the Visiting Forces 
Agreement (VFA), essentially a version of the NATO Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), 
providing protections for U.S. military personnel deployed to the Philippines. The VFA allows the 
two militaries to continue the large engagement activities and exercises reminiscent of the MBA 
period.   
107 Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment–Southeast Asia, “Security and Foreign Forces, 
Philippines,” Jane's Terrorism and Insurgency Centre (May 14, 2009) http://janes.com (accessed 
February 20, 2010).  The CJCS Joint Exercises Balikatan, Vector Balance Piston, and Balance 
Piston are some of the several training events that occur annually between U.S. SF and the AFP.  
These exercises are designed to improve both forces’ planning, readiness, and interoperability. 
Many of the AFP battalions that equip, train, and advise the various CAFGU participate in this 
annual CJCS exercise.   
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with local sensibilities—people who are also familiar to locals—fulfill the GOP’s 
cardinal responsibility: providing security to Filipinos itself. 
G. SUMMARY 
To summarize, training and advising is not a new mission for the U.S. 
Army.  A considerable amount of expertise and knowledge already exists.  U.S. 
forces already conduct training and advising operations throughout the world, 
whether what they do falls under Security Assistance, Security Cooperation, 
Security Force Assistance, or Foreign Internal Defense. 
With this being said, one thing training and advising planners must do 
more consistently is suspend their U.S. frame of reference in order to better 
assess what equipment, training, and infrastructure is most suitable for our 
partners.  As U.S. Joint FID doctrine states, “What worked for the United States 
or another nation may not necessarily work for a third nation. In addition, what 
worked yesterday may not be appropriate tomorrow…. The ability of planners to 
adapt … to specific HN needs is an absolute imperative to success.”108  Of 
critical importance is that planners remain aware that “the ultimate responsibility 
for IDAD rests with the HN.”109     
In this chapter, we have examined three methods of training and advising 
a PN.  Short of invading and needing to dismantle an existing army, working “by, 
with, and through” a PN is the least efficient method for assisting another nation 
to deal with its internal security challenges.  Operating “by, through, but not with” 
a partner nation can be more efficient, but still may not be optimal.  This 
approach seems to work best when a PN will benefit by openly asking for direct 
assistance.  Typically, “by, through, but not with” makes it difficult for the United 




108 DoD, JP 3-07.1, III-9. 
109 DoD, JP 3-07.1, III-1. 
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American presence is not inflammatory, both the United States and the PN are 
almost always better served by a smaller U.S. footprint and the greater use of PN 
forces. 
Best—still—is to train and assist without there being any possibility of 
inflaming sensibilities at either the local or national levels.  Here is where the 
“Indirect–train the trainer” method represents a vast improvement over the other 
two options.  It is the only means that enables a nation to develop its own 
Domestic Internal Defense program, and, thereby, ensures a government is 
fulfilling its social contract with its citizens.  As it happens, this method also 
epitomizes World War I guerrilla advisor T.E. Lawrence’s maxim that it is “better 
to let the Arabs do it tolerably than you do it perfectly.”110  More to the point, it 
fulfills doctrine’s reminders about the importance of sovereignty.  
 
110 T.E. Lawrence, “Twenty-Seven Articles,” in Jeremy Wilson, Lawrence of Arabia: The 
Authorized Biography (Atheneum, NY: 1990), 962.   
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IV. RECOMMENDED METHOD 
A. HISTORY OF SUCCESSFUL INDIRECT FID AND UW  
History offers several examples of an indirect approach to training and 
advising working well, especially when the presence of outsiders would have 
been either too inflammatory locally, or too politically sensitive for the PN 
government.  For instance, the Soviets trained members of the North Vietnamese 
Army within the USSR who, in turn, trained the Viet Cong to fight against the 
United States.111  The United States continues to train the Armed Forces of the 
Philippines Special Forces who, in turn, train the CAFGU who operate 
successfully against insurgents in the Philippines.  United States success in 
supporting the mujahideen against the Soviets in Afghanistan from 1979 to 1989 
represents yet another instance of successful training of the trainers.  Ironically, 
during our incursion into Afghanistan 30 years ago, we funded Pakistan, whose 
ISI organized armies of mujahideen.  Not only did the mujahideen feel far more 
comfortable working with Pakistanis than they would have felt, had they had to 
work with U.S. soldiers, but keeping U.S. personnel out of Afghanistan prevented 
the very dangerous possibility of a direct U.S.–Soviet  confrontation.112   
B. WHAT TO DO? 
Surely, there are lessons in this for how we can best help the Pakistanis in 
the FATA today.  For instance, should U.S. forces take on the role of serving as 
counterinsurgency trainers and advisors working with the Frontier Corps directly? 
Or should the United States take a more indirect role and back well away from 
the FC and the FATA?   
 
 
111  Dana Drenkowski, “Patterns and Predictability: The Soviet Evaluation of Operation 
Linebacker II,” The Journal of Slavic Military Studies 20 (2007), 559–607.    
112 Adam Stahl, “Al-Qa’ida’s American Connection,” Global Politics, http://www.global-
politcs.co.uk/issue6/Stahl/ (accessed March 28, 2010).  
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  The Special Service Group 
Enter the intermediary force.  Pakistan’s Special Service Group (SSG) is 
an extremely professional and capable special operations unit, stood up by the 
U.S. Central Intelligence Agency in 1956, and divided between Pakistan’s Army 
and Navy, with a special operations air wing from the Air Force to provide 
support.113  It is designed as a direct action unit.  It is comprised of four battalions 
(or commandos), which can be increased to six battalions of elite infantry, and 
with a top-tier section capable of surgical direct-action missions.114  This section, 
the Special Operations Task Force (SOTF), consists of two companies, Karrar 
and Zarrar, and one supporting battalion, Third Commando.  All have been 
trained extensively by U.S. Special Operations units, the British Special Air 
Service, and the CIA.  The SOTF was the unit responsible for ending the standoff 
with extremists at the Red Mosque, or Lal Masjid, in Islamabad in 2007.115  Man 
for man, the SSG boasts Pakistan’s best, brightest, and fittest soldiers.   
Given the SSG’s experience, it is more than capable of training the FC in 
infantry-type missions.  What it cannot yet do is function as an advisory unit.  
That is because it lacks the organizational structure and specific training needed.  
Something else the SSG lacks is a tempered approach to counterinsurgency.  
Given its current dispensation, it would never perform a non-kinetic mission apart 
from reconnaissance in preparation for more direct action.  Indeed, for the same 
reasons that the United States should not send a U.S. Ranger battalion to advise 
and train a foreign unit, Pakistan should not send the SSG in its current guise to 
train the FC about how to conduct sensitive counterinsurgency operations.  Like 
U.S. Army Rangers, the SSG is very good at destroying things, but it is not 
designed (nor trained) to interact with the populace non-kinetically. 
 
113 Shuja Nawaz, Crossed Swords: Pakistan, its Army and the Wars within (Oxford, UK: 
Oxford University Press, 2008), 655. 
114 Salman Masood and Ismail Khan, “Bomb at Pakistani Base Kills at Least 15 from Elite 
Unit,” New York Times, September 14, 2007, http:// proquest.com (accessed October 27, 2009). 
115 Salman Masood and Ismail Khan, “Musharraf Defends Raid that Ended Red Mosque 
Siege,” New York Times, (July 13, 2007) http:// proquest.com (accessed December 14, 2009). 
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For its part, the FC will do as the regular army directs it to do.  If, for 
example, the Pakistani Army wants to turn the FC into a strike force, it doubtless 
could.  However, this would represent a waste of one of the FC’s greatest 
strengths: its connections with the people.  If Pakistan’s army were to use the 
FC’s connections and positioning vis-a-vis the local population and augment this 
with the infantry tools and tactics the SSG could provide—along with the wisdom 
to recognize when to apply force or finesse—the FC would be the ideal force for 
the FATA. At the moment, the FC is the only force with the right relationships 
with the populace.   
This is where U.S. Army Special Forces can help.  USAJFKSWCS is the 
proponent in the U.S. military for training U.S. and international troops to train 
other foreign troops or guerrillas.  Special Warfare Center trainers have run the 
Robin Sage guerrilla warfare exercise in rural North Carolina for half a century; it 
remains the only exercise of its kind in the U.S. military.116  Special Forces does 
not just have its “train the trainer” approach to offer the SSG, but the 
infrastructure to do this well away from the FATA where a U.S. presence will only 
cause problems.117  
The United States Special Forces has a long-standing training relationship 
with the SSG.  As Pakistan’s premier special operations force, the SSG already 
has an extremely selective screening process.  This is apparent to any member 
of U.S. Special Forces who has trained with the SSG on its posts in Tarbela, 
Attock Fort, and Cherat, NWFP.  SSG soldiers protect their U.S. Special Forces 
advisor guests with as much, or even more, care than they do their own troops.  
 
116 Chip Cummins, “Play Fighting: A Mistaken Shooting Puts Army War Games Under Tough 
Spotlight–Folks Near Fort Bragg Play Roles of Guerrilla, Enemy in Green Beret Exercises–‘Gun  
Battle' Behind the Citgo,” Wall Street Journal, February 26, 2002, http://www.proquest.com 
(accessed June 14, 2009). 
117 “Three US Soldiers among Nine Killed in Pak Blast,” The Statesman, February 4, 2010, 
http://www.proquest.com (accessed February 16, 2010).  A suicide bomber killed three U.S. Army 
soldiers in Lower Dir, Pakistan, in February 2010 while they were visiting the opening of a girls’ 
school.  Each U.S. soldier was dressed in shalwar kameez, the traditional local garb, in attempts 
to lower their signature.  The soldiers were part of the U.S. Special Operations Training mission, 
and are among eleven U.S. service members who have been killed in Pakistan since 9/11. 
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But, there is also a very real counterinsurgency-related reason for this.  The SSG 
recognizes that the presence of Americans as trainers is problematic as far as 
locals go.  Therefore, during training missions, virtually all of the training takes 
place on fenced-in SSG posts, with no visibility from the outside.   
Most of the training Special Forces is doing with the SSG focuses on small 
unit infantry tactics, with much effort spent in Close Quarter Battle in terrain 
virtually identical to that of the FATA.  This direct action training plays to the 
strengths of the SSG as a very effective counter-terror force and an elite infantry 
unit.  What is paid little attention to at present is any sort of indirect approach to 
counterinsurgency, while what receives no attention is how to train other forces, 
be they counter-insurgents or domestic paramilitaries.     
In other words, what already exists between U.S. Special Forces and the 
SSG is a training relationship.  What is missing is “train the trainer” training 
related to counterinsurgency.  Because U.S. Special Forces already works with 
the SSG, it would be easy to extend the relationship to assist the SSG in how to 
conduct training themselves.  Not only could U.S. Special Forces train the SSG 
in Domestic Internal Defense, but it could partner with them to organize and build 
a capability within the SSG, whereby the SSG could effectively train the Frontier 
Corps and other paramilitary forces.  Americans could do this without ever having 
to set foot in the FATA.  Arguably, they could even do this within the Continental 
United States by cycling Pakistani SSG officers and sergeants through 
specialized training programs established by U.S. Special Forces at Fort Bragg, 
North Carolina, and other more remote posts or training centers.    
Already, the U.S. military trains soldiers and officers from numerous 
partner nations via its IMET programs here in the United States.  Not only are 
foreign officers and soldiers given access to our best military institutions, but also 
to some of our best training programs.  U.S. and international students in these 
schools and training events form lasting friendships.  These friends will often 
cross paths again over the course of their careers.  At the moment, Pakistani 
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officers are few and far between.  As it did several decades ago, the U.S. 
government should invite many more to the United States.  
C. A SOLUTION:  MINIMIZING THE U.S. FOOTPRINT 
Currently, while the SSG is a highly capable commando unit, and is 
certainly capable of training its own forces and other forces within the Pakistani 
security structure for direct-action missions, it does not have a force specifically 
selected or designed to train and advise foreign troops or guerrillas.  Pakistan 
does not have anything akin to U.S. Special Forces.  Consequently, while U.S. 
Special Forces should continue to train with the SSG on its base in Tarbela, 
NWFP, on U.S. bases in Afghanistan, and even here in the United States, we 
should also try to help the Pakistanis build—either within the SSG, or as a unit 
put together from within the SSG—a force specifically designed to plan and 
conduct its own Domestic Internal Defense.  In short, the United States should 
help Pakistan form a “Special Forces” capability—an element made up of small 
teams of trainers and advisors.  With such a capability in-house, Pakistan’s army 
would be much better equipped to turn the Frontier Corps—a force of, by, and for 
the local people—into a far more effective counterinsurgency force for the FATA.  
Ultimately, this is what Pakistan and the United States both need.  It would 
certainly be something the local population would prefer over a large U.S. troop 
presence, and it is what U.S. Special Forces does well. 
D. SUMMARY 
A successful outcome to countering the spreading insurgency in the FATA 
and the NWFP is important to U.S. national security.  At first glance, it makes 
sense that many in Washington want Americans to have “eyes on” in the FATA.  
However, “eyes on” does not have to necessitate boots on the ground.  Not only 
can the United States still monitor the FATA without being there in force—in 
much the same way U.S. intelligence personnel monitored the FATA in 
cooperation with the ISI immediately after 9/11—but by not being present, 
Americans cannot further alienate a population that is already anti-American.  As 
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for whether the United States can contribute to containing the insurgency in the 
FATA without being present, this question should beg another: Could we contain 
the insurgency in the FATA if we were present?  In the case of the Federally 
Administered Tribal Areas, it is actually our presence that makes the insurgency 
so difficult to contain.118 
The United States has contacts and sources operating in FATA; we are 
not totally blind there.  It is clearly critically important that we maintain our 
intelligence connections with the ISI (even if there are some deviant bedfellows 
within its ranks who at times support the Taliban).  This sort of relationship with 
questionable foreign intelligence services is nothing new.  We should always be 
on our guard, just as we can expect other nations’ intelligence services to 
likewise be on their guard regarding us.  But, just as we should strive for nothing 
less than a fully cooperative relationship with the Pakistanis, what is equally 
important is that we strengthen our relationship without having it appear that we 
are trying to manage Islamabad.   
If U.S. Special Forces continued to train the SSG, and helped the SSG to 
form a capable advisory unit, able to train and advise the Frontier Corps to 
effectively conduct counterinsurgency, the United States would not only be able 
to back away from the FATA, thereby easing tensions, but in doing so would 
perhaps generate enough calm to bring the FATA under some modicum of 
control.  There is little doubt that the FATA will always remain somewhat wild, but 
this does not mean that it has to remain a training ground or sanctuary for our 
worst enemies or a planning base from which another attack on the United 
States can be launched.  As this thesis contends, and contrary to what those less 
familiar with the FATA, the FC, and the SSG may advise, the United States can 
most effectively operate from a distance when it comes to the FATA.  Only by 
 
118 These questions are not meant to be hand-wringing over our enemy’s perception of us.  
We should not worry about whether they will like us.  After all, some of these people tolerated the 
Taliban and hosted al-Qaeda, allowing the planning and training that led to 3,000 American 
deaths inside our borders.  Instead, these questions simply take reality into account—about a 
population that does not care either way about the United States, but does care about its 
autonomy.   
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operating more indirectly are we likely to extinguish some of the flames of anti-
Western militancy, and thus reduce al-Qaeda’s prospects for sanctuary in this 
region.  
Taking Pakistani Sensibilities Seriously 
Just as we will not let Pakistan’s territory to be used by terrorists for 
attacks against our people and our neighbours, we cannot allow our 
territory and our sovereignty to be violated by our friends.119  
Pakistan seeks economic, technological, and logistical support from the 
United States to aid it in quelling militant violence.  It does not want U.S. soldiers.  
This sovereign nation is not requesting foreign troops, save those capable of 
instructing its soldiers in these new technologies.  Here, again, is precisely why 
U.S. Special Forces has a critical role to play.  Special Forces is a force 
multiplier, designed specifically, though not exclusively, for situations where U.S. 
forces need to accomplish a very large job, yet maintain a very small footprint.  
But in terms of organizational design, U.S. Special Forces also offers a potential 
template for the SSG. 
A twelve-man Special Forces Operational Detachment-Alpha (SFODA), or 
A-Team is, by doctrine, able to train and advise a foreign battalion-sized 
element.120  Using this math, three SFODAs (36 men) are able to train and 
advise a brigade’s worth of combat forces, while nine SFODAs (108 men) should 
be able to train a division.  Each SFODA is designed to be self-sustaining, 
requiring very little support from its higher elements.  SFODA’s are commanded 
by a captain, with a master sergeant as the Detachment Operations NCO.  A 
warrant officer serves as the Detachment Executive Officer, and coordinates the 
intelligence activities of the team, alongside the Detachment Intelligence NCO.  
Additionally, the team has junior and senior Weapons, Medical, Engineer and 
 
119 Pakistan’s President Zardari to the UN, as quoted in David Morgan, “U.S., Pakistani 
Troops Exchange Fire,” Reuters, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE48O7II20080925 
(accessed February 18, 2010). 
120 United States Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-05.130, Army Special Operations 
Forces Unconventional Warfare (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 
2008), 5-5. 
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Communications NCOs to round out the twelve-man structure.121  Occasionally, 
these teams are supported by Civil Affairs, Psychological Operations, K-9 teams 
and other personnel depending on the nature of the mission.   
Teams already within or formed from within the Pakistani SSG could be 
similarly configured to do “Special Forces-like” missions in the FATA, or 
wherever else Pakistan deems necessary.  Without question, this capability 
would be useful in the FATA, but it could also be of use in training Afghan 
Commandos, for instance. In fact, in early February 2010, the Pakistani 
government offered its training services to the Afghan Army, perhaps in an effort 
to finally show the Americans how training should be done or, more likely, to 
monitor growing Indian presence and influence in the country.122  Regardless of 
where such teams might be used, however, first the capability needs to be 
developed. 
Utilizing the IMET concept, the United States could bring select Pakistani 
SSG officers to Fort Bragg for three to five months of consultations through the 
Army’s Special Warfare Center.  A tailored program could cover everything from  
how Special Forces does assessment and selection to how all phases of the 
Special Forces Qualification Course (SFQC) are organized, to include the final 
exercise in the Special Forces training pipeline, Robin Sage (see Figure 5).123   
 
121 USA, FM 3-05.130, 5-5. 
122 Alex Rodriguez, “Pakistan Says It'll Help Train Afghan Army; Military Chief Kayani Says 
His Nation is Committed to Helping Stabilize its Neighbor,” Los Angeles Times, February 2, 2010, 
http://www.proquest.com (accessed 3 February 2010). 
123 United States Army Special Operations Command News Service, “International Military 
Eligible to Earn the Special Forces Tab,” The United States Army Special Operations News 
Service, no. 091014-04 (October 14, 2009) http://news.soc.mil/releases/News%20Archive/ 
2009/October/091014-04.html (accessed February 19, 2010), 1-2.  From early 2006 to 2009, the 
Army’s Special Warfare Center offered an International Special Forces Training Course designed 
to teach “SF-like” principles to other countries’ officers and sergeants, but with little to no U.S. 
student interaction.  In the past, foreign officers and sergeants used to go through the entire SF 
Qualification Course with their American counterparts, but this process was halted in 2005 and 
continued as a separate course, designed solely for international officers.  In October 2009, the 
Special Warfare Center brought international officers and soldiers back into the Qualification 
Course, recognizing the value of the interactions for both the U.S. and the international students. 
 Figure 5.   U.S. Army Special Forces Qualification Course 
Phase V Program of Instruction  
The point of this multi-month program would not be to run Pakistani 
officers through U.S. training themselves, but to demonstrate in a comprehensive 
manner the way the United States Army produces Special Forces (note: not 
“commando”) teams.  By setting the program up as a consultative exercise, the 
Pakistanis would be able to provide input and receive instant feedback and, in 
the process, work out a Pakistani way to design its own advisory capability and 
form its own teams.   
The Pakistanis have already demonstrated their ability to train and advise 
guerrillas and paramilitary forces. This is what the ISI did so effectively during the 
Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.  Also, there are the army’s long-standing 
command relationships with the Frontier Corps and other paramilitary units used 
in Kashmir.  The Pakistanis have also proven very capable of raising their own 




                                           
from certain areas.  To argue that the Pakistanis would not be able to handle 
“training the trainer” would be to ignore their history, and to ignore what is already 
happening elsewhere in the country.   
The advantage, meanwhile, to the United States helping Pakistan do more 
of this would be twofold: first, the United States could help influence without 
imposing itself; second, it would keep us out of the FATA.  Otherwise, by 
coercing Islamabad to accept U.S. trainers in the FATA, the United States is in 
essence telling the Pakistanis that they are either not capable of training and 
advising their own forces properly, or that Islamabad’s view of how, and by 
whom, its forces are to be trained, does not matter.  Both bespeak either 
arrogance at worst, or at best, a less than equal partnership.  If these are the sort 
of patronizing messages the United States wants to send, so be it—but neither 
will help our cause. 
Better, instead, is to provide Pakistan the tools it requests, the trainers it 
seeks, and then leave it to fight its own battles.124  After all, Pakistan faces a 
much greater threat from terror than does the United States  The militants have 
left no part of the country unscathed.  Pakistan has taken over 30,000 civilian 
and military casualties since 9/11, and a staggering average of ten soldiers a day 
have been killed since 2009.125  According to its own reports, Pakistan has also 
captured or killed as many as 17,000 militants and terrorists from the Pakistani 
Taliban, Afghan Taliban, and al-Qaeda.126  The Pakistani government has 
 
124 Under the train-the-trainer approach described, we envision that joint training programs 
between U.S. SFODAs and SSG units would continue, involving no more than two ODAs at a 
time in Pakistan, and venturing no farther “forward” than the NWFP.  U.S. Intelligence personnel 
would continue to work with the ISI with a very low profile, seeking information leading to al-
Qaeda and only the most important Afghan Taliban targets, and providing “outer ring” 
informational force protection for the ODAs training with the SSG.  Only the most carefully 
selected and specially trained U.S. intelligence personnel, with ISI cooperation, would ever set 
foot in the FATA.     
125 “Global War on Terror Claims 30,000 Pakistani Casualties,” The Economic Times, sec. 
Politics/Nation, February 19, 2010, 
http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics/nation/Global-war-on-terror-claims-30000-
Pakistani-casualties/articleshow/5590230.cms (accessed February 19, 2010). 
126 “Global War on Terror,” The Economic Times. 
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consistently passed key intelligence to the United States regarding some of its 
own citizens, even though this has been an extremely unpopular thing for it to do.  
The Pakistanis have even cooperated and taken part in a series of joint CIA/ISI 
raids in which they apprehended Abdul Salam, the “shadow governor” of Kunduz 
Province, and Mullah Berader, the Afghan Taliban’s number two and the 
Taliban’s Operational Chief for Afghanistan.127  There is no reason to doubt that 
the Pakistanis want to solve their own militant problem.  If they are unable to 
meet the United State’s timeline, then this should be considered a political issue 
for Washington and Islamabad, but not one for the U.S. military to solve.   
 
127 Laura King and Alex Rodriguez, “Major Afghan Taliban Figure Caught; A Provincial 
Insurgent Chief is Captured in Pakistan, and Three Suspected Al Qaeda Militants are Arrested,” 
Los Angeles Times, February 19, 2010, http://www.proquest.com (accessed February 22, 2010).  
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V. CONCLUSION  
The purpose of this study has been to demonstrate that sometimes there 
are better military solutions to training and advising missions than acting “by, with 
and through” a partner nation’s security forces.  Without question, there may be a 
need for unilateral action: this is called an invasion.  There are also times for 
working alongside a foreign government’s forces: this is called partnering.  But 
then, perhaps more often than the U.S. government would like to believe, there 
are times and places when and where the United States should not participate in 
someone else’s fight because our presence will only make things worse—for 
everyone.  This describes the FATA right now.   
Understandably, the United States has had little patience since 9/11 for 
any nation that has dragged its feet in going after those who would threaten U.S. 
citizens.  Today, however, most countries would like to address other pressing 
internal issues—the economy, education, health care and refugees—many of 
which fuel militancy.  Clearly, the sanctuary afforded militants in Pakistan poses a 
threat to the stability of the region and is a direct threat to U.S., Coalition and 
Afghan soldiers working toward stability on the other side of the border.  But, 
even when these problems affect Americans directly, there may be indirect ways 
to address them that are more effective than boots on the ground. 
This study has described the militant situation in the Federally 
Administered Tribal Area of Pakistan, and how the Frontier Corps can be—and 
should be—bolstered to help Pakistan re-secure the FATA.  Significantly, 
however, the enemy is not just confined to the FATA anymore.  Tehrik e Taliban 
Pakistan has moved from Waziristan through the FATA into the Northwest 
Frontier Province and deep into Punjab, even striking Islamabad and Lahore, a 
border city with India.  The extremist problem in Pakistan is not one for the 
Frontier Corps to handle alone; it requires involvement by police, politicians, 
clerics, military and paramilitary alike.  Consequently, this study does not mean 
to imply that the Frontier Corps is the key to solving Pakistan’s militancy problem 
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per se.  But, because the United States has chosen to directly support, train and 
advise the FC in a place where history has not been kind to outsiders, the United 
States has unnecessarily embroiled itself in a situation our presence will only 
make worse—and make worse for Islamabad, never-mind just the FATA.    
The United States continues to conduct drone strikes against the TTP and 
against select al-Qaeda targets when those targets are foolish enough to expose 
themselves.  Meanwhile, the Pakistan Army does the dirty work, conducting 
large-scale, conventional clearing operations in Swat, Waziristan, and elsewhere 
in the Tribal Areas.  Pakistan’s army has the manpower and weaponry (with U.S. 
financial and technological support) to fight these large battles, while its local 
partner, the Frontier Corps, knows the lay of the land, the peculiarities and 
intricacies of the tribal system, and who is who within its patrol areas.  Similar to 
a beat cop, the FC is indispensable for helping the authorities to see through the 
mass of the population and pick out those who do not belong.  The Frontier 
Corps does need additional weaponry, night vision optics, new uniforms, better 
pay, protective equipment and better-armored vehicles.  The militants have the 
FC outgunned in most engagements, and it is well worth the United States’ while 
to provide these items.  The FC also needs training and skilled, experienced 
advisors.  There is no reason we should not supply these, too.  But, we should do 
so bearing one important fact in mind: external forces have been most successful 
whenever they have correctly discerned just how close they needed to get to the 
conflict in order to help make a positive impact, while making sure they got no 
closer.  U.S. Special Forces teams are undoubtedly training the Frontier Corps 
well.  However, that does not change the reality that, at least when it comes to 
the FATA, the best advisor will always be a Pakistani, and the biggest liability an 
American. 
The more the Pakistani government is pressured to allow the United 




has already been stirred and, if handled clumsily, these U.S.-Pakistani operations 
could spur even greater militancy, as resentment against the West and against 
Islamabad intensifies. 
From any angle then, the only reasonable solution appears to be what has 
worked so well elsewhere, under similar circumstances—Americans need to 
stand back, train the right forces to move forward, and let them engage with the 
enemy.  Not only will this help Pakistan (re)assert its sovereignty so that others 
(to include us) do not violate it, but it prevents us from getting caught in a place 
where no one wants us or thinks we belong. 
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